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1 Introduction
In monetary policy history, targeting inflation has not been the main objec-
tive for central banks, and official inflation targeting was first adopted by New
Zealand in 1990. In the last decades, however, most industrialized countries
have sought to implement this approach, as Norway did officially in 2001.
The Norwegian economy is special, in that much of its success hinges on the
oil and gas industry. In addition, unlike comparable small open economies in
the eurozone, Norway has its own currency and conducts its own monetary
policy. By having the opportunity to conduct monetary policy, Norway has
more measures of stabilizing the economy. For example, while high oil prices
would lead to higher production costs and lower output in Europe, Norway
would benefit as it would see high profits from its oil companies, as well as
from suppliers and services related to the oil industry. In such a setting the
European Central Bank (ECB) would want to lower interest rates to stimu-
late the European economy, while Norway would prefer higher interest rates
to dampen the Norwegian boom. On the other hand, euro-countries do not
have to worry about speculators and large fluctuations in their currency.
After the financial crisis Norway has been much better off than most
other European countries, and the Norwegian interest rate has been higher
than the ECB interest rate. The Norwegian krone has been strong and
Norges Bank has been reluctant to increase the interest rate in fear of further
appreciation. In addition, inflation has not picked up and is below its target
level and output growth has been moderate, both reasons why Norges Bank
does not increase the interest rate at the current time. There are, however,
some economists who argue for a higher interest rate than the current level.
One of the problems Norway faces is that housing prices have risen more
quickly than what wages have, which in the long run certainly may lead to
some sort of the collapse should it continue. A result of this is that debt
per household has increased which implies that a considerable percentage
of households will have problems paying their bills if interest rates were to
increase. This is something the governor of Norges Bank, Øystein Olsen, has
expressed concerns about.
The main objectives of this thesis are to investigate whether Norges Bank
is following the Taylor principle, whether stability in other variables than
inflation and output gap is targeted, and whether the results are robust with
regards to variable measures, horizons and sample periods.
Inspired by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) we estimate forward
looking reaction functions using generalized method of moments (GMM) as
estimation method and find that inflation targeting has been an important
objective for Norges Bank in our sample period from 1999 to 2012. Also,
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the results suggest that inflation concerns have been greater than the output
gap concerns. While the results are quite robust to different instrument
sets in the baseline case, we find that different variable measures, different
horizons and alternative specifications of the forward looking model renders
volatile results. Further, there is clear evidence that Norges Bank smooths
the interest rate. We find evidence which suggest that both foreign interest
rates and housing prices are a concern for Norges Bank. In addition, we find
that inflation concerns were higher before the financial crisis which suggests
a structural break in the monetary policy reaction function at the financial
crisis outbreak.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
monetary policy conducted by Norges Bank as well as previous literature on
Taylor rule estimation. Section 3 looks at different Taylor rules and describes
the theoretical model. Sections 4 and 5 respectively present the econometric
procedure and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the
empirical findings and discusses how the results from this thesis fit similar
literature for Norwegian data. Finally Section 7 summarizes the findings,
discusses the relevance of the results and proposes suggestions for future
research.
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2 Monetary policy and previous estimation
of Taylor rules
In this section, we first describe the objectives of Norges Bank and how it
operates. Then we look at how Taylor rules have been estimated earlier and
why empirical findings differ both within and between countries.
2.1 Monetary policy in Norway
The central bank in Norway, Norges Bank, has since 1985, when the law
known as the central bank law was implemented, had the responsibility
of conducting monetary policy, credit policy and currency policy.1 Norges
Bank’s other objectives are to issue coins and notes, to make sure that the
Norwegian payment system is efficient, also in a global perspective, and to
survey the monetary, credit, and currency markets. In March 2001, a mone-
tary policy regulation promoted by the Ministry of Finance was incorporated.
This regulation says that the monetary policy objective should be low and
stable inflation, approximately 2.5 percent yearly inflation.2 In addition, it
says that Norges Bank should aim at stabilizing the Norwegian currency and
expectations of the development of the Norwegian currency. It also says that
the monetary policy should support the fiscal policy by stabilizing the de-
velopment in output and employment. Such an approach is often called a
flexible inflation targeting regime, because while the central bank’s main fo-
cus is inflation stabilization, it does consider other objectives. The horizon of
the inflation target is not stated in the regulation, but Norges Bank declares
that the current horizon is 1-3 years (Norges Bank, 2012a). Until the Norges
Bank inflation report presented in July 2004 the inflation horizon for Norges
Bank was 2 years. The inflation target of 2.5 percent is higher than the tar-
get of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which is 2 percent, and
the European Central Bank (ECB), which is below but close to 2 percent.
Although marginal, there are both possible gains and losses from having a
higher inflation target than 2 percent. A higher target makes it slightly eas-
ier for the government to stabilize or reduce real wages, as the public has
a tendency to think in nominal terms rather than in real terms. Another
gain is that Norges Bank has more maneuverability when determining the
real interest rate. Given equal real interest rates the central bank with the
higher inflation can reduce the nominal interest rate the most, although nei-
ther to a lower level than 0 as a negative nominal interest rate is impossible
1Cf. ”Lov om Norges Bank og pengevesenet mv. (Sentralbankloven) § 1”
2Cf. ”Forskrift om pengepolitikken § 1”
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to implement.3 The potential losses of having a slightly higher target than 2
percent are mostly due to ”menu costs”, the fact that firms have to change
prices more frequently, which poses some administrative costs.
Like most central banks, Norges Bank reasons its monetary policy deci-
sions according to a loss function which looks like this (Norges Bank, 2012a):
L = (pit − pi∗)2 + λ(yt − y∗t )2 + γ(it − it−1)2 + τ(it − i∗)2 (1)
Here the first expression represents the inflation gap, the second expresses
the output gap, the third is the gradualism or smoothing factor and the
last one says something about how far we are from the normal key policy
rate.4 The size of the coefficients suggests how much Norges Bank considers
each deviation, and we see from the quadratic form of the loss function
that positive and negative gaps are looked at as equally damaging to the
economy. In the first monetary policy report by Norges Bank of 2011 the
lambda-coefficient was only 0.1, while in the last monetary policy report of
2012 the coefficient was 0.75 (Norges Bank, 2012b). This suggests that the
weight on output has increased the last two years, which also means that
Norges Bank continuously updates this coefficient, hence the loss function
changes over time.
The main instrument for the central bank to control inflation is the key
policy rate, which is the rate commercial banks get from deposits in the
central bank. This is the ”floor” of the interest rate corridor, while the
”ceiling” is the interest rate on bank’s overnight loans. The interbank lending
rate is the average lending rate between commercial banks in Norway. This
rate is within the interest rate corridor, hence higher than the key policy
rate. The interbank lending rate is what affects consumers directly, which
is the reason why we choose to estimate this rate instead of the key policy
rate. Higher interbank lending rates means that the cost of borrowing gets
higher for the banks, which leads to banks requiring more margin on loans
they give to consumers. This means that consumers will have less disposable
income and consume less, which will dampen aggregated demand. Hence, in
theory, the rate of inflation should be reduced.
Norges Bank claims that it does not use a Taylor rule explicitly other than
as a cross reference when making monetary policy decisions. In fact, Norges
Bank uses, in combination with other models, a macroeconomic model called
the Norwegian Economic Model (NEMO), which minimizes a loss function
3A negative nominal interest rate would mean that people would withdraw all their
assets, as banks would charge for deposits
4In Norges Bank (2012a) the normal key policy rate is expected to be around 4% the
next few years
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such as (1). By using NEMO, Norges Bank uses a method of calibration
rather than estimation when projecting the interest rate path. However in
Norges Bank (2013), the central bank argues that the loss function does not
consider financial instabilities. Hence, the interest rate path that it assumes
in this report is higher than what a strict technical analysis would produce.
Rather than adding financial instability to the loss function, Norges Bank
uses a certain kind of discretion when setting the interest rate.
Basically there are two ways to conduct monetary policy. The central
bank could either follow an interest rate rule or it can optimize the decision
in each period. The latter is also called the method of discretion. A simple
interest rate rule may look like this:
it = α + βpit + γxt , (2)
where it is the interest rate in period t, pit is inflation in period t and xt is
the output gap in period t. α, β and γ are coefficients.
By using the other option, that is optimizing in each period, the loss is
minimized when looking at each period individually. Formally this would
mean minimizing (1) in each period. Because we in this thesis implicitly
assume that Norges Bank follows an interest rate rule, we do not discuss the
potential gains and losses from each of the two ”options”.
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2.2 Why empirical results for reaction function esti-
mations differ
There are several reasons why results from the interest rate reaction function
estimations differ widely both within economies and between economies.
2.2.1 Inflation
Inflation and the inflation gap could in some cases be hard variables to mea-
sure. Not until the end of the 1990s, central banks started to adopt inflation
targeting as a monetary policy target, hence estimating a reaction function
before this period could pose problems. Another issue is that some central
banks do not have a specific inflation target. For example, the ECB has a tar-
get inflation of close to but below two percent. There are for most countries
also big differences between the different types of inflation measures. For ex-
ample, it matters whether a researcher chooses the ordinary consumer price
index inflation or the consumer price index inflation that excludes food and
energy when estimating a reaction function. This will be further described
in the data section, but the insight is that larger inflation fluctuations could
influence the parameters and their level of significance in an empirical model.
2.2.2 Output gap
The output gap is inherently hard to measure, and there are two main reasons
for this. First of all, in order to calculate the output gap there must be
a trend to compare with. Some use a quadratic trend (Clarida, Gali and
Gertler, 1998), some use a linear trend (Taylor, 1993), while some use the
Hodric-Prescott filter or other filters to measure the trend (Esanov, Merkl and
de Souza, 2005). When using most of these methods there are several variants
of each of them. All these possibilities can potentially lead to different results
in an estimation. For example, while Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggests a
coefficient of 1600 on quarterly data for the HP-filter, Statistics Norway uses
40 000. The other big problem related to measuring the output gap is output
uncertainty and the difference between real time data and revised data. Seitz,
Gerberding and Worms (2006) look at the numbers in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998), for the Bundesbank, and find that when using real time data,
there is no evidence of the Bundesbank targeting inflation, contrary to the
results of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). Seitz, Gerberding and Worms
(2006) suggest replacing the level of the output gap with the change in the
output gap, in order to reduce the deviation between real time and revisited
data.
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2.2.3 Variants of the Taylor rule
Different types of Taylor rules yield different results. Rules can be backward
looking or forward looking. What this means is that we can either assume
that the central bank looks at past inflation and output, or the expected
inflation and output for future periods, when setting the interest rate. Rules
can also be hybrid, which means that the central bank considers both lagged
values of variables and future expected variables when setting the interest
rate. Taylor’s original rule is backward looking, but several recent versions
of the rule include an expectation factor. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
reject the backward looking rule in favour of a forward looking rule. However,
they include the lagged interest rate as a regressor, thus formally making it
a hybrid rule. In their proposed rule they use lagged values of variables
as instruments for the expected levels of the regressors. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000) implement a backward looking rule and the results reflect the
forward looking rule. In particular, they write:
In sum, while we view the forward-looking specification as
more plausible a priori, our key insights also obtain from the
backward-looking specification.
The coefficient for the lagged interest rate variable is often called the smooth-
ing parameter. In most estimations when including this variable, researchers
find this smoothing parameter to be highly significant and in some cases
the size of it is close to unity. Rudebusch (2002) however proposes that
smoothing coefficients do not actually reflect smoothing but that they
(...) reflect serially correlated or persistent special factors or
shocks that cause the central bank to deviate from the policy rule.
Hence, Rudebusch (2002) suggests that the lagged interest rate may not en-
ter the actual policy rule at all, and he argues that there is some sort of
misspecification in the models proposed by for example Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998). English, Nelson and Sack (2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004)
partially support some of the views presented by Rudebusch (2002) by show-
ing that adding variables as regressors in a Taylor rule for U.S. data makes
the smoothing parameter drop. However, they both reject the notion of
Rudebusch (2002) that there may be no monetary policy inertia. Casteln-
uovo (2003) employs the emprical model of English, Nelson and Sack (2003)
and finds that interest rate smoothing is not induced by an omitted variable
bias when looking at a Taylor rule in first differences. Smets (2002) argues
that when there is output gap uncertainty, responses are less aggressive than
what they otherwise would be, hence increasing the smoothing parameter.
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Some researchers include other variables such as money supply, the ex-
change rate and the stock exchange index, with various conclusions. Puck-
elwald (2012) estimates both backward looking and forward looking Taylor
rules for 20 OECD countries and adds the nominal exchange rate deviation
from a long term level and the real interest rate deviation from a base country
as regressors in such a reaction function. He finds that in most cases, coun-
tries that have significant coefficients for the exchange rate deviation and/or
the real interest rate deviation, have lower values for their coefficients for
output gap and inflation. Hence, he suggests that these countries conduct
a less active monetary policy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) find that al-
though there are some changes, adding variables in most cases do not change
the coefficients for inflation, the output gap or for the lagged interest rate
substantially when looking at the U.S., Germany, Japan, France, Italy and
the U.K. from the end of 1979 until 1993 - 1994. Belke and Klose (2010)
look at the ECB and the Federal Reserve from 1999 until 2009 and find that
while most variables that are added become significant in a GMM-type esti-
mation, the baseline coefficients do not change much and rarely so the sign
or degree of significance. Siklos, Werner and Bohl (2004) estimate a variety
of different reaction functions for different European countries and find that
the results are highly volatile. They conclude that additional information
variables should not be added as regressors to the Taylor rule, but that they
could be added to the instrument set in a GMM approach to achieve a better
fit and the most plausible results. Other than the lagged value of the inter-
est rate, most agree that the two most important regressors for a monetary
policy reaction function inflation and the output gap.
2.2.4 Structural breaks and observation frequency
One of the reasons that results may differ is the possibility of structural
breaks. For example inflation targets may change as new political guidelines
are implemented. In addition, in many countries the central bank is inde-
pendent, thus it can within the bounds of the guidelines in theory conduct
monetary policy as it pleases. Hence changes within the central bank may
also lead to structural breaks. Inflation targets and horizons for the mone-
tary policy may also change. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) divide the U.S.
post war era into three parts and find large differences in the estimated coef-
ficients. For example, for the backward looking estimates the coefficient for
inflation was 0.86 in the Pre-Volcker period, 1.72 in the Volcker-Greenspan
period and 2.55 in the Post-82 period. Belke and Klose (2010) look at both
the Federal Reserve and the ECB from the start of 1999 and they find that
while the two central banks operated quite similarly until the financial crisis
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started, their policies changed in time of crisis. In the sample period 2007M8
- 2009M6 Belke and Klose (2010) find that the ECB was aiming at stabilizing
inflation at the cost of some output gap losses while the Federal Reserve was
aiming at stabilizing the output gap at the cost of higher inflation. Mishkin
(2009, 2010) claims that monetary policy inertia is less significant during a
financial crisis than otherwise. This is supported by Belke and Klose (2010)
who find that the smoothing parameter was higher in the years before the
financial crisis, than in the time of the crisis, both for the ECB and for the
Fed.
When estimating Taylor rules for the ECB and the Federal Reserve Belke
and Klose (2010) argue that in order to catch the dynamics of the Taylor rule
properly, monthly instead of quarterly data should be used. Islam (2011) on
the other hand estimates both forward and backward looking rules for U.S.
data and finds that the results do not vary with the data frequency being
monthly or quarterly.
2.2.5 Estimation methods
Empirical results will in most cases differ with various estimation methods,
and there are several possibilites when deciding which estimation method to
apply when estimating Taylor rules. Seitz, Gerberding and Worms (2006)
claim that the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1998)
(...) has become standard in the empirical analysis of mone-
tary policy decisions.
GMM estimations have been done for big economies such as Germany (Clar-
ida, Gali and Gertler, 1998; Siklos, Werner and Bohl, 2004) and the U.S
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000; Chadha, Sarno and Valente, 2004), but also
for small open Economies such as Sweden (Jia, 2011), Taiwan (Yau, 2010)
and Slovakia (Maria-Dolores, 2005). In addition to GMM, the method of
maximum likelihood method is also commonly used when estimating forward
looking Taylor rules, such as in e.g. Gozgor (2012) and de Losso (2012). Most
backward looking estimations that include a smoothing parameter relies on a
nonlinear estimation method such as nonlinear least squares (Hofmann and
Bogdanova, 2012) or two stage non linear least squares (Weise and Krisch,
2010). Backward looking estimations without a smoothing parameter can
be done with ordinary least squares (OLS)(Taylor, 1993) or two stage least
squares estimation (Castelnuovo, 2007) if we suspect endogenous right hand
side variables.
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3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we present the original Taylor rule and show theoretically
how we can expand the rule to include a smoothing parameter and make it
forward looking.
3.1 The original Taylor rule
The original Taylor rule was proposed by Taylor (1993) who looked at how
the Federal Reserve had conducted monetary policy in the years 1987-1992.
i = p+ 0.5y + 0.5(p− p∗) + 2 (3)
where i is the federal funds rate, p is the four quarter inflation rate, y is the
percent deviation of real GDP from a target and p∗ is the inflation target.
Because the inflation target is 2 the rule can be reduced to this:
r = 1 + 1.5p+ 0.5y (4)
Hence, when both inflation and output were at their respective target levels,
the ”equilibrium” federal funds rate was 4 and hence the ”equilibrium” real
rate was 2. The rule suggested above was chosen because of its simplicity and
because it ”captured the spirit of the recent research”. Taylor (1993) also
introduced the notion that one should not follow these kind of interest rate
rules mechanically, but rather think of them as a helpful indication for what
needs to be done. Along with the Taylor rule came the ”Taylor principle”,
which says that the nominal interest rate should react more than one-to-
one to changes in inflation. This means that if there is a shock, such that
inflation rises above the target level by one percentage point, the nominal
interest rate should increase by more than one percentage point, in order
to increase the real interest rate and dampen the shock. If the increase in
nominal interest rate is less than one percentage point, the real interest rate
will decrease after a shock, which would then have further accommodated the
shock. The mechanics of the Taylor rule is called ”leaning against the wind”,
meaning that an increase in inflation or output should be responded with an
increase in the nominal interest rate to dampen the economy, and similarly
a reduction would boost the economy if inflation or output decreased.
3.2 The interest rate target in a forward looking Taylor
rule
The original rule Taylor is a backward looking rule. This means that in
period t, the central bank sets interest rate rt based on the inflation from
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t−1 (given a one period target horizon) until t and the output gap in the last
period i.e., t − 1 until t. Such a rule says that the only variable values one
should consider when setting the interest rate are the last period inflation
and output gap.
The original Taylor rule does not consider expected inflation and output
in future periods. This is why most researchers find a forward looking Taylor
rule to be more realistic when an expectation term is implemented. Inspired
by the work of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000) we start off with a target rate i∗t . What this means is that for each
period, the central bank has a target for the nominal interest rate that they
wish to get to. The target rate in period t is:
i∗t = i
∗ + β(E[pit,k|Ωt]− pi∗) + γE[xt,q|Ωt], (5)
where i∗ is the ”equilibrium” nominal interest rate, i.e., the rate that prevails
when both expected inflation and output is on target. pit,k is the annual
inflation rate between period t and period t+ k. Note that this implies that
the inflation variable series will be slightly different for different horizons.
xt,q is the average output gap between period t and period t+ q. Also in this
case variable series will be slightly different for different horizons. β and γ
are the coefficients for the inflation gap and the output gap respectively, and
Ωt is the information set at time t. This means that the values of expected
inflation and expected output gap is based on all the information the central
bank has at that point in time. To simplify the model somewhat, we can
introduce a constant term α = i∗ − βpi∗, so that we get
i∗t = α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt] (6)
We can easily transform this equation to the original backward looking model
by setting k and q equal to -1. Setting q and k to be positive numbers will
make the equation forward looking. Norges Bank has a target horizon of 1
- 3 years which would imply a k between 4 - 12 as we use quarterly data.
As there is no explicit horizon for the output gap we assume it to be rather
short, hence q is set to 1 and 2 as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000).
3.3 The forward looking Taylor rule with interest rate
smoothing
Until now we have only considered the target rate, which is where the central
bank prefers the interest rate to be in order to close the deviations from the
targets. It is, however, widely recognized that central bankers tend to smooth
interest rates. There are several reasons for this, but most importantly the
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central bank wants to avoid large fluctuations in the interest rates in order
to avoid large fluctuations in the value of assets. Interest rate smoothing
is mentioned in the Norges Bank monetary policy report as the importance
of gradualism. It is recognized that interest rates are ”upward-rigid” which
means that large reductions in the interest rate are more common than large
increases.
We have from equation (6) the interest rate target, which is decided
by expected inflation, expected output and a constant term. If we include
interest rate smoothing we have to create an expression for the actual nominal
interest rate. Hence some weight will be put on the target i∗ and the rest will
be decided by how important it is for the central bank to smooth interest
rates, the size of ρ. For the objective function we then have:
it = (1− ρ)i∗t + ρit−1 + νt (7)
Here, ρ is the smoothing coefficient. We also have an exogenous interest rate
shock term νt with zero mean. Now we can insert the target rate (6) into (7)
so that we get a rule for the actual nominal interest rate:5
it = (1− ρ)(α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt]) + ρit−1 + ν1t (8)
Most researchers find that a smoothing consideration is present in most cen-
tral banks, and this is found to be very high in some cases. Suppose for
example that ρ = 0.9 then the interest rate target (6), which the central
bank thinks is optimal, is only approached by 10% of what it would have,
had there been no smoothing. Consider a β with the value 1.5. This means
that to dampen a positive shock on inflation by 1 percentage point, assuming
the output gap is zero, the target rate would say that one should increase
the interest rate say by 1.5 percentage points. However, because of smooth-
ing the increase would only be 10% of 1.5, hence the increase would be 0.15
percentage points.
We can also check whether other variables have any effect on the interest
rate, i.e., whether Norges Bank consider other variables when setting the
interest rate. We can call this additional regressor ht and its coefficient eta.
What we do is to include the expected value of this additional variable to
expand the target function (6) and we get
i∗t = α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt] + ηE[ht|Ωt] (9)
Inserting this new target into the objective function (7) we get
it = (1− ρ)(α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt] + ηE[ht|Ωt]) + ρit−1 + ν2t (10)
5Note that the equation is no longer linear in the parameters
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By using a similar procedure we can add two additional regressors, and the
rule for the actual nominal interest rate will end up like this:
it = (1−ρ)(α+βE[pit,k|Ωt]+γE[xt,q|Ωt]+η1E[h1t|Ωt]+η2E[h2t|Ωt])+ρit−1+ν3t,
(11)
where h1t and h2t are the additional regressors, and η1 and η2 are their
respective coefficients.
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4 Econometric procedure
In this section, we first explain why GMM has been chosen as the estimation
method. Further, we explain the general theory behind GMM, and imple-
ment this method into the Taylor rules described in Section 3. Finally we
explain the intuition behind the test of overidentifying restrictions, the J-test.
4.1 Why OLS could be problematic
The original Taylor rule does not take account of interest rate smoothing,
which means that it is linear in parameters and could be estimated with
linear methods such as ordinary least squares or two-stage least-squares.
However, because we include a smoothing parameter, parameters are non-
linear, which is a violation of the OLS-assumptions that ensure unbiased and
consistent estimators. Hence non-linear estimation methods should be used
in our context.
Because we use a forward looking rule, we assume that the central bank
considers the expected inflation in a future period when changing the inter-
est rate, rather than current inflation. In Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
when checking whether this is true, they find that for none of the central
banks they look at, lagged inflation is statistically significant. Hence, they
reject the backward-looking specification in favour of their forward-looking
specification. When using a forward looking rule the expected explanatory
variables will be endogenous, i.e., correlated with the error term at time t.
Hence, even if we used a linear forward looking rule, OLS would still be a
problem due to violation of zero conditional mean for the error term. In
order to solve the problems of non-linear parameters and endogeneity in the
lead variables, we use generalized method of moments. As noted by Biorn
(2012), GMM can handle endogenous right hand side variables in non-linear
equations. It can also handle residual heteroskedasticity and residual auto-
correlation in equations whose right-hand side variables are correlated with
the disturbances. In addition, GMM does not (as Maximum Likelihood es-
timation) rely on strong distributional assumptions for the disturbances. It
can, for instance, handle situations with skewed distributions.
4.2 GMM in general
In the general GMM model we have the equation
yt = h(Xt;θ) + t, t = 1, ..., T (12)
18
Here yt is the explained variable vector, which is determined by a function
h of the explanatory variable matrix Xt and the parameter matrix θ of
appropriate dimensions, in addition to a vector of an error term t. T is the
sample length. We introduce an instrument matrix Zt which is correlated
with Xt. Then, we define the orthogonality condition, which says that the
instrument should be uncorrelated with the disturbance:
E[Z′tt] = 0 (13)
Substituting for t from 12 gives:
E[Z′t(yt − h(Xt;θ)] = 0 (14)
Hence, if we define the function f(·) to be:
f(θ,yt,Zt,Xt) = Z
′
t(yt − h(Xt;θ)) (15)
we can write the orthogonality condition as
E[f(θ,yt,Zt,Xt)] = 0 (16)
This is the theoretical expectation. We can now create an expression for the
empirical mean of the values of f(θ,yt,Zt,Xt), which we can define as
gT (θ,yt,Zt,Xt) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(θ,yt,Zt,Xt) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Z′t(yt − h(Xt;θ)) (17)
Now, from the definition of the GMM estimator in a general model, we want
to choose the estimator of θ which brings gT (θ,yt,Zt,Xt) as close to the
zero value of its theoretical counterpart E[f(θ,yt,Zt,Xt)] as possible.
4.3 Implementing GMM in a Taylor rule setting
In particular, we have from (8)
it = (1− ρ)(α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt]) + ρit−1 + ν1t (18)
In the following it will be beneficial to introduce an auxiliary variable 1t.
1t = −(1− ρ)(β(pit,k − E[pit,k|Ωt]) + γ(xt,q − E[xt,q|Ωt])) + ν1t (19)
We see that this expression is a combination of forecast errors and the exoge-
nous error term and it is thus orthogonal to any variable in the information
set. We can solve this equation for ν1t to get:
ν1t = (1− ρ)(β(pit,k − E[pit,k|Ωt]) + γ(xt,q − E[xt,q|Ωt])) + 1t (20)
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and insert (20) into our actual nominal interest rate function (18) to get:
it = (1− ρ)(α + βE[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt]) + ρit−1
+(1− ρ)(β(pit,k − E[pit,k|Ωt]) + γ(xt,q − E[xt,q|Ωt])) + 1t
(21)
The expectation terms disappear and we are left with:
it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t (22)
This is what we can call the policy reaction function, and it is precisely this
we want to estimate. By algebraic manipulation we removed the expectation
terms so that we now can write the policy reaction function in terms of
observed variables.
We use an instrument set Zt within the information set Ωt, which is
orthogonal to 1t. Variables included in the instrument set can be any lagged
variables and any current variables that are uncorrelated with 1t. Hence, we
have the condition E[1t|Zt] = 0 which we can write as
E[it − (1− ρ)[α + βpit,k + γxt,q]− ρit−1|Zt] = 0 (23)
Hence, the parameter vector we want to estimate is [ρ, α, β, γ]. Because we in
our empirical analysis use more instruments than there are parameters, the
number of orthogonality conditions exceed the number of parameters to be
estimated. Hence, the model is over-identified and we must test the validity
of the over-identifying restrictions.
Note that when estimating (8), we will get a constant term α = i∗−βpi∗.
We will get to know β, but we will not be able to determine the values of i∗
and pi∗ directly from the estimation. We know, however, that the inflation
target pi∗ in Norway is 2.5 percent and has been so since the start of our
sample period. Hence to find our implied long-run nominal equilibrium rate,
we can use the constant term α = i∗ − βpi∗ and simply solve this equation
for i∗.
We also want to look at a policy reaction function where additional re-
gressors are included. We have from (10):
it = (1− ρ)(α + E[pit,k|Ωt] + γE[xt,q|Ωt] + ηE[ht|Ωt]) + ρit−1 + ν2t (24)
To end up with a policy reaction function in terms of observed variables such
as (22) we perform the same procedure as before. The only difference is that
the term that consists of forecast errors and the exogenous disturbance has
to be slightly rewritten. By doing the calculations, we get a policy reaction
function for the expanded Taylor rule:
it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t (25)
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It is straightforward to add additional variables by following this procedure
to get a policy reaction function for the further expanded Taylor rule:
it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + η1h1t + η2h2t) + ρit−1 + 3t (26)
4.4 The J-test
The J-test, also known as the test for overidentifying restrictions, can be
performed as long as there are more orthogonality conditions than param-
eters. As mentioned earlier, we want to choose the estimator of θ which
brings gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) as close to the zero value of its theoretical counter-
part E[f(θ,yt,Wt,Xt)] as possible. Under the null hypothesis of the J-test
gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) = 0 (27)
The alternative hypothesis is that
gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) 6= 0 (28)
Hence, if the model fits the data well, gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) is close to zero,
in which case we do not reject our null hypothesis. On the other hand if
gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) is far from zero, we reject the overidentifying restrictions
imposed on the model. Exact calculations of the test statistic can be found
in the appendix.
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5 Data
In this section, we present the data used in the empirical analysis. In subsec-
tion 5.1 we present the time series used in the estimations and include figures
for each of the variables. In subsection 5.2 we present the sample periods
used when checking for structural breaks, while in 5.3 we discuss stationarity
and unit root tests.
5.1 Time series
We first look at the original Taylor rule variables, and then proceed by pre-
senting variables used as instruments and variables used as regressors. We
have used OxMetrics6 to create the figures presented in this section.
5.1.1 The interest rate
As a measure for short term nominal interest we use the three month Norwe-
gian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) in annual terms. NIBOR is calculated
by taking the trimmed mean interest rate from six panel banks that operate
in Norway, such that the maximum and the minimum values are omitted.3
These interest rates are supposed to reflect what rates the banks require in
order to lend to other banks, and they should be seen as market rates rather
than binding offers. We use the monthly averages from the NIBOR-statistics
supplied by Norges Bank to create a quarterly average. The money market
rate can be used as a proxy for the short term nominal interest rate which
is what we want to estimate. In figure 1 we can see how the NIBOR has
evolved.
5.1.2 Inflation
We use the consumer price index adjusted for tax changes and excluding en-
ergy commodities, the CPIATE-index, to construct a measure for inflation.
This is also called core inflation in Norway. It is reasonable to exclude en-
ergy commodities for small open economies like Norway because these prices
can be taken as exogenous and says little about price changes in Norway.
By taking the log of the CPIATE-index, we can find the four quarter log
difference which is a measure for the 1-year horizon inflation. For robustness
checks, we also use the CPI-index in the empirical analysis. Figure 2 shows
3The banks are DNB Bank ASA, Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Nordea Bank Norge
ASA, SEB AB and Swedbank
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Figure 1: The interest rate
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the movements in the CPIATE-measured inflation. We see that for most of
our sample period inflation has been below target.
5.1.3 The output gap
To obtain a measure of the output gap, we first look at the gross domes-
tic product for mainland-Norway with a four quarter smoothing average.
Mainland Norway consists of all domestic production activity except from
exploration of crude oil and natural gas, services activities incidental to oil
and gas, transport via pipelines and ocean transport. If the oil and gas indus-
try was included, we would see larger fluctuations in output, which would be
largely affected by exogenous shocks, something that could disturb our esti-
mation results. It may be thought of as a paradox that Norway is completely
reliant on its oil industry, while at the same time we do not consider the oil
industry when calculating inflation and the output gap. However, we want
to look at how Norges Bank reacts to what it knows. Supply and demand
shocks in the oil and gas sector are hard if not impossible to forecast and are
not affected by Norges Bank at all. To find the output gap, we have to look
at output compared to a trend. By only using data for the Norwegian GDP,
we can create a trend variable. This can be done by using a Hodric-Prescott
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Figure 2: Inflation
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filter, which minimizes an equation with regards to the trend component:
Minτ (
∑
(yt − τt)2 + λ
∑
[(τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1)]2) (29)
Here, yt is actual output in period t and τt is the trend at time t. The λ
suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) for quarterly data is 1600. Statis-
tics Norway, however, uses a λ value of 40 000, as they argue that such a
trend fits the Norwegian economy better than what 1600 does. We will in
the baseline forward looking model case use 40 000, which is suggested by
Statistics Norway, but also try using 1600 to check if the results are robust.
The effect of a change in λ can be illustrated quite simply. Let us say lambda
is 0, then the trend equals the output gap, hence the ”trend” would be actual
output y. When lambda goes to infinity the trend approaches a straight line,
like the one used by Taylor (1993).
The trend may change depending on which sample period we use to create
the trend. It seems reasonable here to use the longest possible sample period
obtainable to capture the right trend. Hence, even though we use the period
1999Q1 - 2012Q4 when estimating, we use a longer sample (1978Q3 - 2012Q4)
to create the trend τ . From this it is straightforward to obtain a measure of
the output gap (OG):
OG = (
y − τ
τ
)100 (30)
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Figure 3: The output gap
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Figure 3 shows the movements in the output gap for our sample period.
5.1.4 Additional information variables
In addition to these main variables, we use other variables to carry out the
empirical analysis. We use the 1-year horizon world commodity price infla-
tion and the spread between long and short term interest rates in Norway
(from here on called the long-short spread) as instruments in our baseline
model.6 The world commodity price inflation is obtained from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s ”International Financial Statistics” database while
the spread is calculated from OECD-data on Norwegian short and long term
interest rates.
Several other variables have been obtained to check if their presence as
regressors can alter the empirical results. First, we look at the 3-month
interbank lending rate in the euro area found in the OECD database as a
proxy for foreign interest rates. In the empirical model, we use the 4 quarter
log difference for this variable. Second, the import weighted currency, the
I-44, measures the Norwegian currency against Norway’s 44 biggest trade
partners and is used as a measure for the Norwegian exchange rate. We got
6The short term interest rate is in this case the NIBOR, while the long term interest
rate is the 10 year bond
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the monthly data from Norges Bank, and used the three month average to
express it in quarterly terms. In the empirical model, we use the 4 quarter
log difference for this variable.
Another variable we apply is a measure for the housing price deviation
from trend, a housing price gap. We obtained the housing price index from
Statistics Norway and created a HP-trend using a λ-value of 40 000. We
also use the quarterly average of the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index
(OSEBX), and find the four quarter log difference for this variable as a proxy
for the equity return in Norway. We also look at debt per capita, which
is obtained by taking the total household debt in Norway obtained from
Statistics Norway, and dividing it by the number of citizens. Then, we found
the four quarter log difference to create the variable series. Figures 4, 5 and 6
display all the additional information variables, and how they move relative
to the interest rate.
We also test alternative variable measures of some of the variables pre-
sented so far, in the empirical analysis.
5.2 Sample periods and structural breaks
Although Norges Bank officially started inflation targeting in 2001, most
economists agree that inflation targeting was implemented as Svein Gjedrem
was appointed governor of the Norwegian central bank in January 1999. In
fact he said so himself, when he expressed that in order to stabilize the
Norwegian currency, inflation must be brought down to the level of other
European countries (Gjedrem, 1999). That is the reason why our baseline
sample period is 1999Q1 - 2012Q4, instead of 2001Q2 - 2012Q4. In addition,
more observations yields more reliable results.
We want to learn whether the parameters in our reaction function are
stable, in particular whether the parameters have been affected by changes
in the Norwegian economy. The financial crisis, which erupted in the late
third quarter of 2008, when Lehmann Brothers collapsed on September 15th,
may have changed how the central bank conducts monetary policy and gives
us a reason to search for a potential structural break in this period. Another
potential structural break could be when Norges Bank changed their time
horizon for the inflation target from 2 years to 1-3 years in the second quarter
of 2004. A third possible structural break would be when Øystein Olsen took
over for Svein Gjedrem as governor for Norges Bank. However, because this
happened in January 2011, and because we end our estimation in the fourth
quarter of 2011 because of the leaded inflation variable, we do not have
enough data to work with. Hence this will be a topic better suited for future
research.
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Figure 4: Additional information variables
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Figure 5: Additional information variables
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Figure 6: Additional information variables
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5.3 Stationarity and unit root tests
Our econometric approach relies on the assumption that all the variables
are stationary, I(0). A variable yt is stationary if (1) E(yt) = µ, i.e., the
expected level is constant for all t, if (2) the variance is independent of time,
V ar(yt) = σ
2 and if (3) Cov(yt, yt−s) = Cov(yt, yt+s) = γt such that the
covariance between periods is time independent. Stationary time series, I(0),
unlike processes that are integrated of order 1, I(1), contains no unit roots.
Our main variables are the interest rate, the inflation rate and the output
gap. In the appendix a formal test for stationarity is carried out and test
results are given. We find that both for the output gap and for inflation
we can reject non-stationarity at some lag levels by use of the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. While the test do not reject non-stationarity for
the interest rate variable, we stress that the ADF-test is known to have low
power for variable series that are different from but close to I(1). Hence
the test often fails to separate near-integrated processes from non-stationary
ones (Banerjee et al., 1993, ch.4).
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6 Empirical findings
We will in subsection 6.1 first present how the original Taylor rule fits our
data and the motivation behind this. In subsection 6.2 we present the find-
ings from our baseline estimation. In subsection 6.3 we discuss the choice of
instruments and how our baseline equations varies with the choice of instru-
ments. In subsection 6.4 we discuss the choice of additional regressors, and
in subsection 6.5 we present the results we get from adding these additional
regressors. In subsection 6.6 we look at alternative horizons for inflation and
the output gap, while in subsection 6.7 we discuss alternative variable mea-
sures and how these measures affect the results. In subsection 6.8 we look
for structural breaks by performing estimations for different sample periods,
and also by including dummy variables.
6.1 Fitting the original Taylor Rule
For motivational reasons, we first look at the coefficients suggested by Taylor
(1993) and see how well they fit the actual interest rate. Although the original
Taylor rule was extracted from U.S. data, the value of λ in equation (1)
suggested by the monetary policy reports of Norges Bank, is not necessarily
far off from such a rule. Recall from equation (4) that the constant coefficient
in this case is 1, the inflation coefficient is 1.5 and the output gap coefficient
is 0.5. Figure 7 presents the comparison. We see that although the fit is not
perfect, the original Taylor rule does a remarkably good job.
6.2 The baseline case
Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000) we look at the forward looking Taylor rule where the left hand side
variable is the interest rate and the right hand side variables are the 1 quarter
lagged interest rate, a 1 year horizon annual inflation rate and a 1 quarter
horizon output gap, corresponding to k = 4 and q = 1 in (8). The sample
period is 1999Q1 - 2012Q4.
According to theory and past empirical results we would expect positive
coefficients for both inflation and the output gap and naturally also for the
lagged endogenous variable. The coefficient for the lagged endogenous vari-
able is, however, expected to be below 1 as smoothing the interest rate is not
the only objective. Because we use a 4-quarter forward term our estimation
period ends after the fourth quarter of 2011.
The instruments we use in our baseline case are four lags of the inter-
est rate, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation and the
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Figure 7: Fitting the original Taylor rule
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short-long spread. This is a reasonable baseline instrument set as we ex-
pect neither the world commodity price inflation nor the long-short spread
to directly affect the setting of the interest rate. It is exactly the same set
of instruments used in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), which makes the
results comparable. This means that we use 21 instruments (including a
constant term), and hence the model has more instruments than the num-
ber of estimated coefficients. Because of this we have to check whether the
overidentifying restrictions are valid by means of the J-test. We estimate 4
parameters so the J-test has a χ217 distribution under the null. The GMM es-
timation is done in EViews and we use the default settings when performing
the analysis. We use time series (HAC) as weighting matrix which according
to EViews6 User’s Guide II (2007) will give estimates that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. The kernel type is
Bartlett and by the words of EViews6 User’s Guide II (2007) this ”deter-
mines the functional form of the kernel used to weight the autocovariances in
computing the weighting matrix”. The last option we have is the bandwith
selection which determines how the weights given by the kernel change with
the lags of the autocovariances in computing the weighting matrix. Here we
choose Newey and West’s fixed bandwith selection criterion. Table 1 shows
the outcome.
In this specification the constant term and lagged interest rate are signif-
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Table 1: Estimating (22) - the baseline casea
α ρ β γ J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of reg.
1.68∗∗
(0.79)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.06
(0.74)
0.96
(0.59)
8.97
(0.94)
0.517
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied
to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end
estimations 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the
4 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments are four lags of nominal
interest rates, inflation, output gap, world commodity price inflation
and the spread between short term bills and long-term bonds. k = 4,
q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
icantly greater than zero. Although neither the inflation coefficient nor the
output gap are significant at a ten percent significance level, both are fairly
close to being significant, respectively at 16 and 11 percent. The inflation
coefficient is 1.06, the coefficient for output is 0.96 and the constant term
is 1.68. The estimated smoothing parameter is 0.89, which suggests a high
degree of monetary policy inertia, but the coefficient is significantly lower
than unity. All coefficients have the expected signs.
The implied long run equilibrium nominal rate can be calculated by look-
ing at the constant term:
α = (i∗ − 2.5β) (31)
and inserting our estimated coefficients
1.68 = (i∗ − 2.5 ∗ 1.06) (32)
Solving (32) for i∗ we get
i∗ = 4.33 (33)
This is very close to the mean in the sample period, which is 4.29. It follows
that the implied long run equilibrium real rate is
r∗ = i∗ − 2.5 = 1.83 (34)
We see from Table 1 that the overidentifying restrictions passes the J-test
in the baseline case as the J-probability is 0.94. By keeping in mind that
the standard error of the baseline regression is 0.517, we can compare the
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fit to other models later in this thesis. While our estimated coefficients
have the right sign, we would expect the inflation coefficient to be somewhat
higher and the output gap coefficient to be somewhat lower, considering that
Norges Bank supposedly is targeting inflation first and foremost according
to its monetary policy reports as described in subsection 2.1.
6.3 The choice of instruments
Although we suspect the instrument set used in the baseline model to be
valid, in that they correlate with the regressors but not with the error term,
it would be wise to check whether other instrument sets give different results,
in other words, to test if our results are robust. We test several instrument
sets for the baseline forward looking model. Our information set Ωt consists
of the interest rate, inflation, the output gap, the world commodity price
inflation, the long-short spread, foreign interest rates, the exchange rate,
housing prices, equity return and debt per capita. Table 2 shows the results
for some chosen instrument sets. We see that when the number of instruments
is reduced, by removing 1 and 2 lags from the baseline instruments, neither
the inflation nor the output gap coefficients are significant. In these cases
only the lagged interest rate is a significant regressor. When using our whole
information set of 10 variables, each with 4 lags, in addition to a constant as
instruments, 41 instruments in total, the inflation coefficient is 1.86 and the
coefficient on the output gap is 0.60. These results seem plausible and both
coefficients are significant at a 1 percent level. The smoothing parameter
is 0.87 and is also highly significant, as well as being significantly different
from unity. The constant term is 0.68 and significant, which gives a long run
real interest rate r∗ of 2.83. In Table 2 we see that the coefficient values lie
for the most part between 1.5 and 2 for inflation and between 0.5 and 0.9
for the output gap, when we use more instruments than in the baseline case.
The smoothing coefficient is very robust to the choice of instrument sets with
values between 0.87 - 0.93. The constant parameter, however, is apparently
not very stable. We can conclude that the baseline forward looking model
is quite robust to the choice of instruments. When adding instruments, we
see that the estimations show that Norges Bank follows the Taylor principle
as the inflation coefficient is above 1 in most cases. In addition the results
suggest that Norges Bank puts more weight on stabilizing inflation than
output.
The fear of adding too many instruments comes from the fact that some
of the instruments may be weak, which can yield misleading estimation re-
sults. Mavroeidis (2004) argues that problems can occur when estimating
forward looking Taylor rules when the predictable variation in inflation is
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Table 2: Estimating (22) - different instrument setsa
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of reg.
2.10
(2.83)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.06)
1.15
(2.14)
0.79
(1.24)
11b 5.53
(0.60)
0.526
3.20
(3.03)
0.93∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.17
(2.42)
1.42
(1.59)
16c 6.62
(0.88)
0.531
1.68∗∗
(0.79)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.06
(0.74)
0.96
(0.59)
21 8.97
(0.94)
0.517
0.79
(0.58)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.78∗∗∗
(0.44)
0.68∗∗
(0.26)
25 10.39
(0.97)
0.515
1.48∗∗
(0.58)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.23∗∗∗
(0.41)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.24)
29 11.86
(0.99)
0.516
0.82∗
(0.43)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.78∗∗∗
(0.27)
0.64∗∗∗
(0.11)
33 12.59
(0.99)
0.515
0.63∗∗
(0.26)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.94∗∗∗
(0.17)
0.57∗∗∗
(0.09)
37 12.95
(0.99)
0.515
0.68∗∗∗
(0.19)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.86∗∗∗
(0.14)
0.60∗∗∗
(0.09)
41 13.51
(0.99)
0.515
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied
to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end
estimations 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the
4 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case (21
instruments) are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then we add
to the instrument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the exchange rate,
housing prices, equity return and debt per capita, respectively. k = 4,
q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b The instruments are two lags of interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread.
c The instruments are three lags of interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread.
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small relative to unpredictable future shocks. We mentioned in Section 4
that the instruments must be correlated with the right hand side variables,
but not with the error term. Hence, when using all these instruments we as-
sume that the lags included in the instrument set correlate with our forward
terms. A correlation matrix is given in the appendix to show that this is
the case. The theoretical argument is that the central bank does have access
to all these variables and uses most of them to predict future inflation and
output, and then uses these predictions to set the interest rate.
If we believe that Norges Bank reacts to other variables when setting
the interest rate, then we should be careful when including instruments.
In our baseline model we implicitly assume that lagged values of output
gap, inflation, the interest rate, commodity price inflation and short-long
spread do not correlate with the error term. If we include lagged values of
other variables in the instrument set, we must make sure that their current
value does not affect the interest rate setting decision. For example, let
us consider a variable x which has a significant effect on the interest rate,
but is not included as a regressor, thus effectively it is part of the error
term. Its lagged values, which most likely correlate with the current value,
are used as instruments. Hence, the instruments may correlate with the
error term which violates the orthogonality condition. This is why some
researchers, as for example Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Puckelwald
(2012) when conducting GMM, only add lagged values to the instrument set
after including the current value of the instrument as a regressor.
At this point it would be wise to introduce the J-test, which tests the
validity of the overidentifying restrictions, that is whether the instruments
are weak and if they violate the orthogonality conditions. Following Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1998) our null hypothesis for this test is that the central
bank adjusts the interest rate each period so that equation (22) holds, with
the expectations on the right-hand side based on all the relevant information
available to policy makers at that time. This implies the existence of values
for all our coefficients [β, γ, ρ, α] such that the implied residual 1t is orthog-
onal to the variables in the information set Ωt. Our alternative hypothesis
will be that the central bank adjusts the interest rate in response to changes
in some current and/or lagged variables, but not necessarily in connection
with the information that those changes contain about future inflation and
output. If so, then some relevant explanatory variables are being omitted
from the interest rate equation. To the extent that some of those variables
are correlated with our instrument set Zt, the set of orthogonality conditions
will be violated, which would lead to a statistical rejection of the model given
a sufficiently large sample. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) claim that a fail-
ure to reject orthogonality implies that lagged variables enter the reaction
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function only to the extent that they forecast future inflation or output.
From Table 2, we see that for none of the instrument sets suggested
we can reject the overidentifying restrictions, hence all our instrument sets
seems to correlate with the leaded variables, but not with the error term.
This corresponds with Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000) who use similar instrument sets, and a similar number of
instruments.
6.4 The choice of regressors
There are reasons to believe that small open economies, more so than large
economies, react to other variables than the output gap and inflation, for
example exchange rates and foreign interest rates. The reasoning behind
this is that small currencies are more vulnerable to speculation and that
the fluctuations for these currencies are larger. Also, when a crisis occur,
investors seek ”safe havens” such as gold, the U.S. dollar or the euro. For
example in Figure 5, we see that the exchange rate depreciated (corresponds
to an increase in the exchange rate variable) when the financial crisis erupted,
but have steadily appreciated from there on. A large appreciation of the
Norwegian krone will hurt the export industry as it becomes relatively more
expensive to buy from Norwegian exporters. Hence, we would expect a small
open economy to follow closely the changes in foreign interest rates, as a
high Norwegian interest rate relative to our trading partners will increase
the demand for the Norwegian krone, and make the currency appreciate.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) add lagged inflation, money supply, for-
eign interest rates and the exchange rate when checking whether other vari-
ables should be used as regressors. They find that for most countries the
baseline coefficients for inflation and the output gap do not change substan-
tially when adding these variables as regressors. Siklos, Werner and Bohl
(2004) estimate different Taylor rules for France, Germany and Italy with
different instrument sets and argue that although some asset prices, such as
real exchange rates and real estate prices are included in the reaction function
as regressors and found to be significant, the results are not rubust. Instead
they find that adding alternative variables as instruments, not as regressors
in a GMM estimation, makes the estimates more plausible and that they also
achieve a better fit. They believe that these results suggests that the central
banks did not directly respond to asset price developments, but that they
influenced inflation and output gap expectations.
We consider the monetary policy reports by Norges Bank when choosing
our additional regressors, and the results will be presented in the next sub-
section. First, Norges Bank tries in some degree to stabilize the Norwegian
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exchange rate. In Norges Bank (2013) it says that ”There is also a risk of a
further appreciation of the krone. Should inflation be lower than projected,
or the krone show a marked appreciation, the key policy rate may be re-
duced”. Hence, an appreciation of the Norwegian krone should be followed
by a lower interest rate and vice versa. We use the import weighted exchange
rate index of the krone as a measure for the Norwegian currency. This index
decreases when the Norwegian krone appreciates. An appreciation will in-
duce a lower interest rate, hence we expect the coefficient to be positive when
we include the exchange rate as a regressor in an estimated model. While
the exporting industry in Norway pushes for a depreciation of the Norwegian
krone, the main goal for Norges Bank is to keep the exchange rate somewhat
stable.
The exchange rate is affected by foreign interest rates. A lower foreign
interest rate, makes it more likely that investors want to keep their assets in
the Norwegian krone as it yields a relatively higher return than other curren-
cies. When the demand for the Norwegian krone is high then it appreciates,
and Norwegian industry suffers because Norwegian goods are relatively more
expensive. Hence, we expect both the currency and foreign interest rates
to be significant, either as instruments that affect inflation and output ex-
pectations or as regressors. More specifically, if currency stabilization is a
target then we should include lagged values of the foreign interest rates in
the instrument set. The coefficient on foreign interest rates is expected to be
positive in an estimated model.
There are also some concerns in Norges Bank that the housing prices are
increasing at an unsustainable high level, which has resulted in increasingly
higher debt per capita. We would expect the coefficients on this regressor to
be positive, as a higher interest rate increases the cost of borrowing money
and dampens the housing market. We will also try to include the commodity
price inflation, equity return and debt per capita as additional regressors in
the reaction function. If these variables are not targeted then they should
not alter the other coefficients and the coefficients of these variables should
not be significantly different from zero.
6.5 Including variables as regressors
In 6.5.1 we add our potential variables as regressors individually to see if
they are significant and whether they change the other coefficient values or
significance. In 6.5.2 we look at the case where two additional variables are
added as regressors. Note that we are not searching for a perfect interest
rule, but we want to see how the baseline coefficients and the additional
coefficients behave in different specifications.
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6.5.1 Including one additional variable as regressor
In table 3 we can see what happens when adding variables as regressors,
estimating equation (25). When adding variables as regressors we also include
4 lags of the additional variable in the instrument set.
Table 3: Estimating (25) - adding variables as regressorsa
α ρ β γ η J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of reg.
Baseline 1.68∗∗
(0.79)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.06
(0.74)
0.96
(0.59)
8.97
(0.94)
0.517
Adding :
Foreign I.R. 1.03∗
(0.58)
0.88∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.80∗∗∗
(0.40)
0.35∗∗
(0.14)
0.03∗∗∗
(0.01)
10.49
(0.96)
0.473
Exch. rate 0.50
(0.30)
0.83∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.91∗∗∗
(0.22)
0.42∗∗∗
(0.14)
−0.30∗∗∗
(0.05)
9.72
(0.97)
0.421
Hou. prices 6.96∗∗
(3.29)
0.93∗∗∗
(0.02)
−2.22
(2.30)
0.67
(0.43)
1.27∗∗∗
(0.51)
11.23
(0.94)
0.443
Com. inf.b −1.71
(1.15)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
2.36∗∗∗
(0.63)
0.38∗
(0.21)
0.13∗∗∗
(0.04)
9.22
(0.90)
0.434
Eq. return −25.74∗
(14.55)
0.98∗∗∗
(0.01)
14.06∗∗
(6.37)
0.41
(0.96)
0.55∗
(0.32)
10.07
(0.97)
0.467
Debt P.C. −5.73∗∗∗
(1.78)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.19∗∗∗
(0.53)
−0.28
(0.20)
0.60∗∗∗
(0.14)
11.11
(0.94)
0.494
Lagged inf.b 2.06∗
(1.20)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.03)
2.09∗∗
(0.98)
0.80
(0.57)
−1.12
(1.04)
9.78
(0.88)
0.515
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α+ βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level are denoted by ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to quarterly Norwegian data for the period
1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end estimations 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because
of the 4 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case are four lags of the
interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation and the long-short
spread. When adding variables as regressors we include additional 4 lags of this variable to the
instrument set. k = 4, q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b For world commodity price inflation and lagged inflation, the lags of these variables are already
included in the instrument set, hence for these specifications the baseline instrument set is
used.
Overall, we see that coefficients of the reaction function change a lot when
adding some of the variables as regressors. When foreign interest rates are
added to the Taylor rule equation we see that although the coefficient for
this variable is highly significant, the value of the coefficient is seemingly
low. The results say that when foreign interest rates rise by 1 percent the
interest rate increases with 0.03. Note, however, that this is the 4 quarter log
change, hence when foreign interest rates are low, small changes will yield
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large log changes. For instance, if foreign interest rates increases from 0.5
to 1, then this is a 100 percent increase, which means that the Norwegian
interest rate will increase by 3 percentage points according to the estimated
coefficient. From this, we get that Norges Bank reacts stronger to foreign
interest rate changes when this interest rate is low than when it is high. In
this specification the inflation coefficient is larger than unity and the output
gap coefficient is low, but positive and significant. The smoothing coefficient
barely changes from the baseline case and is still highly significant.
When the exchange rate is added to the reaction function the coefficient
for this variable is negative and highly significant. The result suggest that
when the Norwegian krone appreciates, the interest rate is increased, which
theoretically would lead to a further appreciation. Hence, the sign of this
coefficient is not as expected. This is in line with the results of Puckelwald
(2012) who finds this coefficient to have the ”wrong” sign for 16 of the 20
countries he looks at, including Norway. In any case, the inflation coefficient
in this specification is 1.91 and the output gap coefficient is 0.42, both highly
significant. Again, the smoothing coefficient is high and significant. We see
that for both these specifications, the values of the inflation coefficient and
the output gap coefficient are not far from the ones we see when we use the
full instrument set, see Table 2.
However, when including the housing price gap as a regressor, our original
estimates change dramatically and it seems that our forward looking model
breaks down. The inflation coefficient is now negative and insignificant, and
although the output gap coefficient has the expected sign, it is insignificant.
In addition, the coefficient for the housing price gap is unexpectedly high.
Such a model suggests that if the housing price is 1 percentage point above the
trend, interest rates increases with 127 basis points, which seems implausible.
Although this result suggests that Norges Bank considers housing prices when
setting the interest rate, we can not draw this conclusion as the coefficient
of the other variables are insignificant, which very well may come from some
sort of misspecification in the model.
We also include other variables in the reaction function that are not ex-
plicitly said to be targeted according to the monetary policy reports, but
that potentially could have an effect. From Table 3 we see that when adding
the world commodity price inflation to the reaction function its coefficient
is highly significant and the value is 0.13, which means that a world com-
modity price inflation of 1% leads to the Norwegian interest rate increasing
by 0.13 percentage points. In this specification, the inflation coefficient is
higher than in previous specifications (2.36) and significant, and the output
gap coefficient is positive and significant at a 10 % level. Still, the smoothing
coefficient remains high and significant.
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Including the equity return as a regressor renders the output gap coef-
ficient insignificant, while the inflation coefficient is very high (14.06) and
significant. The equity return coefficient is positive, but barely significant at
a 10% level. The results suggest that Norges Bank increases the interest rate
when equity returns increases, hence the coefficient has the expected sign.
However, the smoothing coefficient is very close to unity in this specification,
and we see from the value of some of the coefficients that the results are
highly implausible.
When debt per capita is added to the reaction function the inflation co-
efficient is above 3 and highly significant, while the output gap coefficient
is insignificant. The debt per capita coefficient is significant, and it sug-
gests that a 1% increase for this variable increases the interest rate with
0.60 percentage points. However, because the constant term in this case is
largely negative, we should be careful drawing conclusions. The smoothing
coefficient is 0.84 and highly significant.
Including lagged inflation as a regressor yields results which suggest that
while expected inflation is targeted, Norges Bank does not pay too much at-
tention to what the inflation rate was in the last period. In this specification,
the output gap coefficient is again insignificant.
6.5.2 Including two additional variables as regressors
We proceed by concentrating on variables mentioned in Norges Bank mone-
tary policy reports, and try to add two additional regressors to the baseline
case. The results are presented in Table 4 and we can see that both inflation
coefficient and the output gap coefficient is significantly greater than zero
when adding foreign interest rates and the exchange rate. The coefficients
for these two additional regressors are also highly significant and their val-
ues are similar to the case where each of them are added separately. Note
that this case yields the lowest standard error of regression. However the
coefficient for the exchange rate still has the ”wrong” sign.
When adding foreign interest rates and housing prices as regressors nei-
ther the inflation nor the output gap coefficient is significant. The coefficient
for the foreign interest rate is close to what it is when added individually and
significant, and the housing price coefficient is high and significant.
When the exchange rate and housing prices are added as regressors to the
reaction function both of them are significant. However, the housing price
coefficient is much lower than in previous estimations. In this specification
both the inflation coefficient and the output gap coefficient is significant,
although their values are lower than in previous models.
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Table 4: Estimating (26) - adding 2 variables as regressorsa
α ρ β γ η1 η2 SE of
reg.
Baseline 1.68∗∗
(0.79)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.06
(0.74)
0.96
(0.59)
0.517
Adding :
ift and ext
b 0.23
(0.21)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.16∗∗∗
(0.15)
0.17∗∗
(0.08)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.33∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.371
ift and hout
c 5.59∗∗∗
(1.61)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.01)
−1.07
(1.04)
0.38
(0.26)
0.03∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.16)
0.425
ext and hout
d 1.85∗∗∗
(0.59)
0.86∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.14∗∗
(0.42)
0.24∗∗
(0.11)
−0.31∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.39∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.386
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + η1h1t + η2h2t) + ρit−1 + 3t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level
are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. ift is foreign interest rates, ext is
the exchange rate and hout is housing prices. The estimation is applied to
quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end estima-
tions 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the 4 quarter
lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case are four lags of the
interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation and
the long-short spread. When adding variables as regressors we include addi-
tional 4 lags of this variable to the instrument set. k = 4, q = 1. Values in
parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b J-stat: 11.06, J-prob: 0.98
c J-stat: 11.75, J-prob: 0.97
d J-stat: 9.94, J-prob: 0.99
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6.6 Horizons
Until now, we have looked at a 1-year horizon inflation variable and a 1-
quarter horizon output gap. We want to check whether different horizons
can have a significant effect on the empirical results. First we extend the
inflation horizon to two and three years.
As the current horizon stated by Norges Bank is 1-3 years, we could ex-
pect a 2-year horizon to be a probable ”average” horizon. Using the same
instrument set (21 instruments) in our baseline forward looking model with a
two year inflation horizon yields an inflation coefficient of 1.75 and an output
gap coefficient of 1.10, both coefficients being significant at the 10% level.
The lagged endogenous variable is again highly significant and has a coeffi-
cient of 0.91, significantly below unity. When using the whole information
set the inflation coefficient is 0.85 while the output gap coefficient is 1.47,
both statistically significant at the 1 % level. The result are shown in Table
5. We see that for various instrument sets most (disregarding the baseline
instrument set) inflation coefficients have a value of about 0.8 - 1.2, while
the output gap coefficients have a value around 1.3 - 1.5. This indicates that
the Taylor principle in some of the specifications in Table 5 has not been
followed, contrary to the 1-year horizon results.
This is an interesting result, but not a surprising result. If the central
bank has a longer horizon for stabilizing inflation it will put more weight on
stabilizing the output gap in the current period. Also, when changing the
horizon, we ”force” the estimation to focus more on the output gap and less
on inflation than in the 1-year horizon case. Hence, these results suggest
that if Norges Bank uses a 2 year horizon, it puts more weight on closing the
output gap than stabilizing inflation. We now look at how the coefficients in
the Taylor rule with a 2-year horizon inflation changes when adding variables,
see table 6.
Including the foreign interest rates as regressors reduces the coefficient
for output gap somewhat relative to the baseline case. However the inflation
coefficient remains largely the same. In addition, we see that foreign interest
rate has a somewhat larger effect than for the 1-year horizon inflation case
and it is still significant. When adding the exchange rate, we see that the
inflation coefficient becomes very high relative to the baseline case, while
the coefficient for output gap is close to zero. Again we see that the sign
for the exchange rate coefficient unexpectedly is significantly negative. If we
add the housing price gap, we see that the results are similar to the 1-year
horizon inflation case, as the inflation coefficient is negative and insignificant.
Including the world commodity price inflation also has similar effects as in
the 1-year horizon inflation case. When debt per capita is added we see
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Table 5: Estimating (22) - different instrument sets, 2-year inflation
horizona
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
0.30
(1.37)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.75∗
(1.01)
1.10∗∗
(0.54)
21 8.73
(0.95)
0.536
0.98
(1.14)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.18
(0.85)
1.38∗∗∗
(0.45)
25 9.47
(0.98)
0.536
1.13
(0.90)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.14
(0.74)
1.37∗∗∗
(0.40)
29 10.71
(0.99)
0.536
1.41∗
(0.77)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.01)
0.86
(0.66)
1.44∗∗∗
(0.37)
33 11.38
(0.99)
0.536
1.19∗
(0.60)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.04∗
(0.56)
1.36∗∗∗
(0.32)
37 12.02
(0.99)
0.535
1.36∗∗∗
(0.28)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.85∗∗∗
(0.29)
1.47∗∗∗
(0.13)
41 12.39
(0.99)
0.535
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied
to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2010Q4, as we end
estimations 8 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the
8 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case (21
instruments) are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then we add
to the instrument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the exchange
rate, housing prices, equity return and debt per capita, respectively .
k = 8, q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
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Table 6: Estimating (25) - adding variables as regressors, 2 year horizon inflationa
α ρ β γ η J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
Baseline 0.30
(1.37)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.75∗
(1.01)
1.10∗∗
(0.54)
8.73
(0.95)
0.536
Adding :
Foreign I.R. 0.99
(1.20)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
1.65∗∗
(0.81)
0.64∗
(0.38)
0.04∗∗∗
(0.01)
10.03
(0.97)
0.503
Exch. rate −2.51∗∗
(1.07)
0.86∗∗∗
(0.01)
3.89∗∗∗
(0.78)
0.01
(0.19)
−0.40∗∗∗
(0.06)
8.76
(0.99)
0.442
Hou. prices 5.89∗∗∗
(1.82)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
−1.36
(1.19)
0.47
(0.32)
0.95∗∗∗
(0.21)
10.69
(0.95)
0.457
Com. inf.b −3.80
(2.80)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.03)
2.94∗
(1.61)
0.78
(0.50)
0.18∗∗∗
(0.06)
9.07
(0.91)
0.465
Debt P.C. −13.30∗∗∗
(2.51)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.02)
5.85∗∗∗
(0.61)
−0.68∗∗
(0.27)
0.97∗∗∗
(0.21)
10.19
(0.96)
0.509
Lagged inf.b 0.16
(1.51)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.02)
2.21
(1.85)
0.99
(0.66)
−0.35
(1.18)
8.65
(0.93)
0.543
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level
are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to quar-
terly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2010Q4, as we end estimations
8 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the 8 quarter lead
on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case are four lags of the in-
terest rates, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation and
the long-short spread. When adding variables as regressors we include addi-
tional 4 lags of this variable to the instrument set. k = 8, q = 1. Values in
parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b For world commodity price inflation and lagged inflation, the lags of these
variables are already included in the instrument set, hence for these specifi-
cations the baseline instrument set is used.
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that the output gap coefficient is negative, which is theoretically implausible.
In addition, the other coefficients are very high in absolute values, which
suggest that this model is misspecified. Lagged inflation as a regressor is
also insignificant for this horizon, which is also the case for leaded inflation
and the output gap. We choose not to include equity returns in the table as
a regressor, as this yields a smoothing coefficient of exactly one such that all
other coefficients are highly insignificant.
The results from these estimations suggest that when additional regres-
sors are implemented in a 2-year horizon specification, the inflation coefficient
in most cases is larger than the output gap coefficient. In all cases where
inflation is significant at the 10% level this holds. Only when housing prices
are added the output gap coefficient is higher. However neither the inflation
coefficient nor the output gap coefficient is significant in this case. The re-
sults contradict the results from the different instrument set specifications
presented previously, which suggested that in a 2-year horizon specification,
the output gap was most important for the central bank. We also note that
the smoothing parameter is highly significant in all cases.
From table 7 we see that extending the inflation horizon to three years
yields surprising results. We only include the baseline instrument set case
and the full information set case in the table, to show that the results are
theoretically implausible. Accordingly, we will not pay any more attention
to specifications with three years inflation horizon
Focusing on the baseline model, we now look at a two-quarter horizon
for the output gap, with the baseline instrument set and the full instrument
set implemented. Table 8 shows the results. We see that using the baseline
instruments yields a significant inflation coefficient which is larger than one.
The output gap coefficient, however, is insignificant, while the smoothing
coefficient is high (0.89) and significant. However, when the full instrument
set is used, we see that the difference in the horizon specifications for output
are very small. In the 2-quarter horizon case, the inflation coefficient and
the output gap coefficient is 2.14 and 0.51 respectively, while they were 1.86
and 0.60 for the 1-quarter horizon case. This suggests however that if the
instrument set is limited, output gap horizon changes will alter the results,
as it did for inflation horizon changes.
6.7 Alternative variable measures
So far we have measured inflation by means of core inflation, CPIATE. Now,
we replace CPIATE with CPI to create an alternative measure for inflation.
We also try replacing the original output gap with an output gap created by
a HP-trend with a λ of 1600. In addition, we look at the case where unem-
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Table 7: Estimating (22) - 3-year inflation horizona
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
15.74∗∗∗
(4.37)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.02)
−10.39∗∗∗
(3.55)
4.76∗∗∗
(1.28)
21 8.67
(0.95)
0.518
13.46∗∗∗
(0.66)
0.94∗∗∗
(0.005)
−9.42∗∗∗
(0.69)
5.13∗∗∗
(0.38)
41 11.50
(0.99)
0.513
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied
to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2009Q4, as we end
estimations 12 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the
12 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case (21
instruments) are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then we add
to the instrument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the exchange
rate, housing prices, equity return and debt per capita. k = 12, q = 1.
Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
Table 8: Estimating (22) - 2-quarter horizon output gapa
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
1.08∗
(0.54)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.53∗∗∗
(0.53)
0.80
(0.51)
21 8.99
(0.94)
0.519
0.30
(0.17)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.14∗∗∗
(0.12)
0.51∗∗∗
(0.08)
41 13.47
(>0.99)
0.517
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied
to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end
estimations 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the
4 quarter lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case (21
instruments) are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output
gap, world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then
we add to the instrument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the
exchange rate, housing prices, equity return and debt per capita. k = 4,
q = 2. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
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Figure 8: Alternative variable measures
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ployment replaces the output gap, in order to see if the results reflect the
baseline case. Next, we look at a an alternative measure of changes in hous-
ing prices to see if this new variable alters the other coefficients as much as
the original housing price variable does. In particular we take the 4 quarter
log change in housing prices minus the 4 quarter log change in nominal wages
to create this new variable. Again, we look at the baseline model and use
both the baseline instrument set and the full instrument set in two different
estimations for all alternative variable measures. The four alternative vari-
able measures are depicted in Figure 8, with the original variable included
for comparison.
We see that coefficients change dramatically when replacing the CPIATE-
index with the CPI-index. In particular the inflation coefficient becomes sig-
nificantly negative when using the baseline instrument set, while the output
gap is higher than in the baseline case and significant. Although the results
are somewhat surprising, we can imagine that Norges Bank does not pay
much attention to the CPI-index. Hence it is hard to make inference on
these results. However, we see that the estimation results are conditional on
the choice of price index.
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Table 9: Estimating (22) and (25) - alternative variable measuresa
α ρ β γ η No. of
instr.
SE of
reg.
Baseline 1.68∗∗
(0.79)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
1.06
(0.74)
0.96
(0.59)
21 0.517
Baseline 0.68∗∗∗
(0.19)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.86∗∗∗
(0.14)
0.60∗∗∗
(0.09)
41 0.515
Variable
change:
CPI 6.11∗∗∗
(1.54)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.01)
−1.70∗∗
(0.81)
2.19∗∗∗
(0.56)
21 0.538
CPI 3.51∗∗∗
(0.61)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.32
(0.27)
1.59∗∗∗
(0.15)
41 0.503
Output-
1600
2.68∗∗
(1.01)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.73
(0.71)
1.58∗
(0.79)
21 0.496
Output-
1600
2.52∗∗∗
(0.48)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.01)
0.82∗∗
(0.32)
1.76∗∗∗
(0.28)
41 0.495
Unemp. −1.97
(2.20)
0.83∗∗∗
(0.03)
3.15∗∗∗
(0.50)
0.29
(0.46)
21 0.534
Unemp. 2.26∗∗∗
(0.62)
0.86∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.54∗∗∗
(0.12)
−0.67∗∗∗
(0.12)
41 0.525
Wage adj.
housing
priceb
−2.70∗∗
(1.28)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.41∗∗∗
(0.57)
0.06
(0.22)
0.36∗∗
(0.14)
25 0.488
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level
are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to
quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end esti-
mations 4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the 4 quarter
lead on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case (21 instruments)
are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world com-
modity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then we add to the in-
strument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the exchange rate, hous-
ing prices, equity return and debt per capita. k = 4, q = 1. Values in
parentheses are standard errors for coefficients. J-stat(J-prob) for specifica-
tions: Base21: 8.97(0.94), Base41: 13.51(0.99), CPI21: 10.12(0.90), CPI41:
13.21(0.99), Output − 160021: 0.64(0.92), Output − 160041: 12.80(0.99),
Unemp21: 10.71(0.87), Unemp41: 13.22(0.99), WHP: 11.37(0.94).
b Here, we estimate it = (1 − ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t. When
adding the variable as regressors we include additional 4 lags of this variable
to the instrument set.
48
When we change the HP-filter for the output gap, we see again that
coefficients change considerably. Now the output gap coefficient is much
higher than in the case where λ is 40 000, both when we use the baseline
instrument set and when we use the full information instrument set. The
inflation coefficient is also lower than in the baseline case, and we see that
it is substantially lower than the output gap coefficient. Hence, if we believe
Norges Bank uses a λ of 1600 when measuring the output gap then this
results suggest that stabilizing the output is more important than keeping
inflation at target for Norges Bank.
We also try to implement the unemployment rate, by replacing the output
gap. Unemployment is considered to be closely related to the output gap, and
in theory unemployment should have a negative effect on the interest rate.
In other words, we expect the coefficient for unemployment to be negative.
The variable we use is obtained from the labor force survey of Statistics
Norway. We see that inflation is highly significant in this specification, and
that when using the full instrument set a one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate will lead to the interest rate being reduced by 0.67
percentage points, which seems plausible.
When applying the alternative housing price variable, we see that the
inflation coefficient is larger than unity and highly significant. The output
gap coefficient, on the other hand, is insignificant and close to zero in this
specification. The coefficient for the new housing price variable is significantly
positive and suggests that a 1% positive difference between the change in
housing prices and the change in nominal wages, increases the interest rate
by 0.36 percentage points. There can be several reasons why the results differ
when using this alternative housing price variable. The most obvious is that
the HP-filtered case does not directly take wage changes into consideration.
However, during a recession, wage inflation will be dampened and the positive
HP-trend will also be dampened, hence wages are indirectly considered in the
housing price gap. In any case, we would expect wages to correlate with the
housing prices, and Norges Bank is probably more interested in how housing
prices changes in relation to wage changes, as the major concern is a housing
bubble in which borrowers are not able to pay their debts.
The results for this subsection suggest that the model is very sensitive to
different variable measures. In particular, we see that both the inflation and
the output gap coefficient changes quantitatively. While earlier subsections
suggest that inflation is the primary target for monetary policy, we see that
a small change in the output gap measure can dispute these findings.
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6.8 Sample periods
So far we have looked at the sample period 1999Q1 - 2012Q4. Now, we
will look at whether the coefficients change if we split this period into two
periods. Let us call the first period the pre financial crisis era, i.e., the
period before the fourth quarter of 2008. One can argue that the financial
crisis already started in late 2007, but in the case of a small open economy
like Norway, most agree that it hit after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008. Hence, the other period, the post financial crisis era, is
2008Q4-2012Q4. We now go back to the baseline case with a 1-year horizon
inflation and a 1-quarter horizon output gap from a HP-trend with a λ of 40
000.
Table 10: Estimating (22) - 1999Q1-2008Q3 - different instrument setsa
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
−1.17
(0.76)
0.82∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.73∗∗∗
(0.40)
−0.29
(0.18)
21 8.88
(0.94)
0.424
−1.16∗∗
(0.44)
0.85∗∗∗
(0.01)
3.57∗∗∗
(0.18)
−0.06
(0.12)
25 9.93
(0.98)
0.405
−0.75∗∗
(0.29)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.98∗∗∗
(0.19)
0.46∗∗∗
(0.14)
29 10.20
(0.99)
0.395
−0.74∗∗∗
(0.13)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.98∗∗∗
(0.07)
0.45∗∗∗
(0.05)
34 10.24
(0.99)
0.395
−0.75∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.003)
3.01∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.42∗∗∗
(0.05)
37 10.31
(0.99)
0.395
−0.71∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.002)
2.96∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.45∗∗∗
(0.03)
41 10.35
(0.99)
0.395
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is ap-
plied to quarterly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2008Q3. The
instruments for the baseline case (21 instruments) are four lags of the
interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation
and the long-short spread. Then we add to the instrument set four lags
of foreign interest rates, the exchange rate, housing prices, equity return
and debt per capita, respectively. k = 4, q = 1. Values in parentheses
are standard errors for coefficients.
We see from Table 10 which reports estimation results for the pre financial
crisis era that for all instrument sets the coefficient for inflation is higher than
in the baseline sample period, c.f. 2. Although the coefficient on the output
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gap is not significant when using only our baseline instrument set, we see
that as more instruments are included the output coefficient ”stabilizes” at
0.4 - 0.5, which is lower than in the baseline sample period. Hence at first
sight it seems as though inflation deviation was a bigger concern and that
closing the output gap was a lesser concern before the financial crisis.
Table 11: Estimating (25) - 1999Q1-2008Q3 - adding variables as regressorsa
α ρ β γ η J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
Baseline −1.17
(0.75)
0.82∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.73∗∗∗
(0.40)
−0.29
(0.18)
8.88
(0.94)
0.424
Adding :
Foreign I.R. −1.61∗∗∗
(0.43)
0.90∗∗∗
(0.01)
3.94∗∗∗
(0.27)
−0.58∗∗∗
(0.07)
0.10∗∗∗
(0.01)
10.00
(0.97)
0.332
Exch. rate −0.35
(0.37)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.02)
2.80∗∗∗
(0.26)
0.14
(0.14)
−0.20∗∗∗
(0.03)
9.08
(0.98)
0.360
Hou. prices 1.79∗∗∗
(0.42)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.01)
1.78∗∗∗
(0.23)
−0.15∗∗
(0.07)
0.48∗∗∗
(0.06)
9.62
(0.97)
0.359
Com. inf.b −1.39
(0.84)
0.83∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.75∗∗∗
(0.44)
−0.26
(0.19)
0.01
(0.01)
8.60
(0.93)
0.425
Eq. return −1.01
(0.74)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.02)
3.57∗∗∗
(0.40)
−0.15
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.02)
9.75
(0.97)
0.414
Lagged inf.b −0.19
(0.29)
0.65∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.87∗∗∗
(0.26)
−0.10
(0.11)
1.25
(0.14)
5.98
(0.99)
0.416
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level are
denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to quarterly
Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2008Q3. The instruments for the
baseline case are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap,
world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. When adding
variables as regressors we include additional 4 lags of this variable to the
instrument set. k = 4, q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for
coefficients.
b For world commodity price inflation and lagged inflation, the lags of these
variables are already included in the instrument set, hence for these specifi-
cations the baseline instrument set is used.
Next, we look at other model specifications with additional regressors
as we did earlier for the full sample, see Table 11. When looking at the
coefficient for the foreign interest rate we see that this is much higher in
the pre financial crisis era than in the full sample period. This could be
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related to the fact that the foreign interest rate was higher in this period.
Hence, changes in percentages were smaller during this period than for the
full sample. In this specification, however, the output gap coefficient becomes
significantly negative, while the coefficient on inflation is close to 4.
Also in this sample period, we get the counter intuitive result of a negative
coefficient on the exchange rate, but the effect is less than in the baseline
sample period. The inflation coefficient is high and significant, while the
output gap coefficient is insignificant.
It seems that housing prices were less targeted in this period as the co-
efficient for this variable is less than half for the full sample counterpart. In
addition, the inflation coefficient is positive and significant for this sample
period and specification. Again the output gap coefficient is significantly
negative, though the value is small.
Neither the world commodity price inflation nor the equity return has a
significant effect in this sample period and both coefficients are very close to
zero. We choose not to include the results for the case when debt per capita
is added as it yields highly implausible results, and the smoothing coefficient
is close to unity. However, if we add lagged inflation to the reaction function
we see that the corresponding coefficient is positive and highly significant.
We see that in this case the smoothing coefficient is relatively low to what
we see in the other models, which may suggest some sort of misspecification.
The results for the post financial crisis era are presented in table 12.
Because we find the coefficients to be largely independent of which instrument
set we use in the baseline model, we present only the case where variables
are added as regressors.
The results from the post financial crisis era are interesting. Note, how-
ever, that we only have 12 observations in this case. Hence, the sample is
very small and we should be careful drawing any conclusions. We see that
in all specification the smoothing parameter is much lower than in previous
cases, which points in the direction of the findings of Mishkin (2009, 2010)
that the smoothing parameter is lower in times of financial crisis. In addi-
tion, we see that in the baseline case both the inflation and the output gap
coefficient is negative and insignificant, which indicates that in times of crisis
perhaps other variables are targeted. The inflation coefficient is significantly
negative when foreign interest rates are added, while significantly positive
and high when the exchange rate is added, which suggests that this sample
period may be too small to be included in an empirical analysis.
We also introduce a dummy variable as a cross check to see if there really
was a structural break at the time of the financial crisis, see table 13. The
dummy variable has value 1 in the period 2008Q4 - 2010Q3, as an example
period and 0 in all other periods. We see that the coefficient for the dummy
52
Table 12: Estimating (25) - 2008Q4-2012Q4 - adding variables as regressorsa
α ρ β γ η J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
Baseline 2.27∗∗∗
(0.63)
0.67∗∗∗
(0.10)
−0.08
(0.39)
−0.17
(0.18)
4.72
(0.86)
0.595
Adding :
Foreign I.R. 5.85∗∗∗
(0.98)
0.48∗∗∗
(0.09)
−0.99∗∗
(0.39)
1.08∗∗∗
(0.30)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
4.60
(0.87)
0.468
Exch. rate −1.35
(0.71)
0.64∗∗∗
(0.13)
2.80∗∗∗
(0.68)
−0.15
(0.27)
−0.20∗∗
(0.06)
4.10
(0.85)
0.542
Hou. prices 3.35∗∗∗
(0.83)
0.74∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.55
(0.50)
0.03
(0.32)
0.18∗∗
(0.06)
3.83
(0.92)
0.619
Com. inf.b 1.82∗∗
(0.67)
0.54∗∗∗
(0.13)
1.46∗∗∗
(0.35)
0.79∗∗
(0.27)
0.04∗∗
(0.01)
4.61
(0.80)
0.367
Eq. return −2.85∗∗∗
(0.70)
0.52∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.81∗∗
(0.35)
−0.34∗∗
(0.12)
0.86∗∗∗
(0.17)
4.67
(0.79)
0.529
Lagged inf.b 8.49∗∗∗
(1.12)
0.65∗∗∗
(0.08)
−1.18∗∗
(0.44)
1.32∗∗∗
(0.27)
−1.38∗∗∗
(0.21)
4.76
(0.78)
0.521
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level
are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to quar-
terly Norwegian data for the period 2008Q4-2011Q4, as we end estimations
4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the 4 quarter lead
on inflation. The instruments for the baseline case are four lags of the in-
terest rates, inflation, the output gap, world commodity price inflation and
the long-short spread. When adding variables as regressors we include addi-
tional 4 lags of this variable to the instrument set. k = 4, q = 1. Values in
parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b For world commodity price inflation and lagged inflation, the lags of these
variables are already included in the instrument set, hence for these specifi-
cations the baseline instrument set is used.
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variable is highly significant and negative. It suggests that in our chosen
”crisis-period” the long run equilibrium interest rate was 3.30 percentage
points lower than usual, which suggest that there really was a structural
break.
Table 13: Estimating (22) - 1999Q1-2012Q4 - dummy variablea
α ρ β γ η J − stat
(J−prob)
SE of
reg.
Dummyb 1.01∗
(0.53)
0.82∗∗∗
(0.02)
2.19∗∗∗
(0.36)
0.13
(0.13)
−3.30∗∗∗
(0.77)
8.83
(0.92)
0.488
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q + ηht) + ρit−1 + 2t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level
are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The estimation is applied to quar-
terly Norwegian data for the period 1999Q1-2011Q4, as we end estimations
4 quarters prior to the latest available data because of the 4 quarter lead
on inflation. The instruments are four lags of the interest rates, inflation,
the output gap, world commodity price inflation and the long-short spread.
k = 4, q = 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
b Dummy has value 1 in period 2008Q4-2010Q3, and 0 for all other periods.
Next, we look at a potential structural break in the second quarter of 2004
when Norges Bank changed from a 2-year horizon inflation perspective to a
1-3 year horizon inflation perspective. However, because there are obvious
signs of a structural break at the time of the financial crisis, we end this
estimation in the third quarter of 2008. In particular the first sample is
1999Q1 - 2004Q2, while the other sample is 2004Q3 - 2008Q3. The results
are presented in Table 14.
We see that the results from both estimations are implausible, which could
have something to do with the smoothing coefficient being close to unity.
Because of this, we cannot determine if there has been a structural break at
the time of the horizon change, and whether coefficients have changed, hence
we do not pursue this potential structural break any further.
6.9 Comparison of results for Norway
As mentioned before not many interest rate rules have been estimated in the
case of Norway. However we want to compare the results from this thesis
with previous results.
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Table 14: Estimating (22) - 1999Q1-2004Q2 and 2004Q3 - 2008Q3a
Sample
period
α ρ β γ # of in-
str.
SE of
reg.
1999Q1-
2004Q2
−31.25∗∗∗
(10.60)
0.96∗∗∗
(0.01)
18.79∗∗∗
(5.46)
−5.49∗∗∗
(1.87)
21 0.470
1999Q1-
2004Q2
−31.69∗∗
(10.69)
0.96∗∗∗
(0.01)
18.96∗∗∗
(5.52)
−5.53∗∗∗
(1.88)
41 0.470
2004Q3-
2008Q3
4.25
(3.28)
0.99∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.61∗
(1.41)
8.46
(7.10)
21 0.107
2004Q3-
2008Q3
4.25
(3.28)
0.99∗∗∗
(0.01)
2.61∗
(1.41)
8.46
(7.10)
41 0.107
a Estimating it = (1− ρ)(α + βpit,k + γxt,q) + ρit−1 + 1t
Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance
level are denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The instruments
are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world
commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. Then we add to
the instrument set four lags of foreign interest rates, the exchange rate,
housing prices, equity return and debt per capita. k = 4, q = 1. Values
in parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.
99− 0421: J-stat(J-prob):7.78(0.97)
99− 0441: J-stat(J-prob): 7.83(0.99)
04− 0821: J-stat(J-prob): 5.63(0.96)
04− 0841: J-stat(J-prob): 5.63(0.96)
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Puckelwald (2012), with a sample period 1980Q1 - 2008Q4, finds in his
forward looking model using GMM that for the baseline case only the lagged
interest rate is significant, while inflation and output, though with positive
coefficients, are not. When adding nominal exchange rate deviation from
a natural level and real interest rate deviation from a base country as re-
gressors, inflation becomes significantly positive, with a coefficient of 1.381.
The coefficient for output is, however, still insignificant, neither is the one
for the exchange rate gap. For the real interest rate deviation the coefficient
is significant although the sign is not as expected. Puckelwald (2012) also
estimates a backward looking Taylor rule with the same variables. In the
baseline specification, the inflation coefficient is 1.04 while the output gap
coefficient is 2.23, both significant. In the expanded Taylor rule specification
the inflation coefficient is 1.32, while the output gap coefficient is 0.29, still
both significant. The additional variables are also significant at a 10 percent
level, though neither has the expected sign.
Bernhardsen and B˚ardsen (2004) have a limited dataset, i.e., quarterly
data from 1999 until 2004. When using only output gap, inflation and lagged
interest rate as regressors in their backward looking model, they find a signifi-
cant inflation coefficient of 2.82 and a non-significant output gap coefficient of
-0.38. The smoothing coefficient is 0.67 and highly significant. Bernhardsen
and B˚ardsen (2004) argue that because their sample period is so small, they
put a lot of weight on how they expect the coefficients to be and choose the
most plausible models. For example, they replace the output gap with the
output growth gap to find more plausible results. Bernhardsen and B˚ardsen
(2004) also discuss the trade weighted exchange rate and claim that including
the exchange rate in a single equation model yields significantly wrong sign
for the coefficient. The reason, they claim, is that there is a simultaneity
problem. They show that when estimating a simultaneous model, the signs
become as they first expected.
Bernhardsen and Gerdrup (2007) find that when performing estimations
to find a neutral interest rate, the inflation coefficient is 2.2 and the coefficient
for the output gap is 0.3. In this estimation they use quarterly data from
January 1997 until 2006. This estimation is also a backward looking OLS-
estimation and they do not include a smoothing parameter. They stress that
the output gap coefficient is not statistically significant and that it is sensitive
to the estimation period chosen.
Gagnon and Ihrig (2001) address the pass-through of exchange rate changes
into domestic inflation for 20 industrialized countries from a time period
of 1971Q1 until 2003Q3. Among other results, they find by using the IV-
estimation method that the inflation coefficient for Norway is 0.6 with a
standard deviation of 0.33, and that the output gap coefficient is -0.96 with
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a standard error of 0.33, while the smoothing coefficient is 0.86 and highly
significant. They also split the estimation into two subsamples where in the
latest period, from 1990Q1 until 2003Q3 the inflation coefficient is 10.00 with
a standard deviation of 8.22, while the output gap coefficient is 1.64 with a
standard deviation of 2.97, hence none of them are significantly different from
zero. The smoothing coefficient is in this subsample still highly significant
and the value of the parameter is 0.85.
Table 15 shows how some of the baseline estimations in this thesis com-
pare to previous estimations. We only state whether the coefficients are sig-
nificant at the 10% level, as some of the previous estimations did not report
standard errors. We see from table 15 that our pre financial crisis estimation
with the full instrument set our result for the inflation coefficient resemble
the one of Bernhardsen and B˚ardsen (2004) when they include a smoothing
parameter. They do however find a much lower smoothing parameter, and
an insignificant output gap coefficient. For the specifications without interest
rate smoothing by Bernhardsen and B˚ardsen (2004) and Bernhardsen and
Gerdrup (2007), they find, as we do for the pre financial crisis sample pe-
riod, a high inflation coefficient, although in their case it is not statistically
significant. Gagnon and Ihrig (2001) finds a significant inflation coefficient
below unity. However they look at a time period from 1971, a period where
inflation was not targeted. This goes for Puckelwald (2012) as well, as the
sample start in this case is 1980. He finds a much higher smoothing co-
efficient than we do, and lower inflation coefficients. Because none of the
comparable estimations have included the post financial crisis era we should
be vary when comparing previous results to our full sample results, as we
have shown earlier that there are signs of a structural break.
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Table 15: Previous Taylor rule estimations for Norwaya
Sample period Author Estimation
method
ρ β γ
1971Q1-2003Q3 Gagnon and
Ihrig
IVb 0.86∗ 0.60∗ −1.96
1997Q1-2006Q3 Bernharden
and Gerdrup
OLSc 2.2 0.3
1999M1-2004 Bernharden
and B˚ardsen
OLSc 2.2 −0.6
1999M1-2004 Bernharden
and B˚ardsen
OLSd 0.67∗ 2.82∗ −0.38
1980Q1-2008Q4 Puckelwald OLSd 0.935∗ 1.04∗ 2.23∗
1980Q1-2008Q4 Puckelwald GMMe 0.975∗ 1.20 13.48
1999Q1-2008Q3 This thesis GMMf 0.89∗ 2.96∗ 0.45∗
1999Q1-2012Q4 This thesis GMMg 0.89∗ 1.06 0.96
1999Q1-2012Q4 This thesis GMMf 0.87∗ 1.86∗ 0.60∗
a Estimating Taylor rules. Rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 10 per-
cent significance level is denoted by ∗. The coefficient for the constant
term is not included in table.
b Estimating it = (1−ρ)(α+βE[pit,k|Ωt]+γE[xt,q|Ωt])+ρit−1+ν1t. The
instruments are lags of the interest rates, inflation and the output gap.
k = 4, q = 4.
c Estimating it = α + βpit + γxt + 
d Estimating it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(α + βpit + γxt) + 
e Estimating it = (1−ρ)(α+βpit,k+γxt,q)+ρit−1+ 1t. The instruments
are three lags of the interest rates, inflation and the output gap. k = 1,
q = 1.
f Estimating it = (1−ρ)(α+βpit,k+γxt,q)+ρit−1+ 1t. The instruments
are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world
commodity price inflation, the long-short spread, foreign interest rates,
the exchange rate, housing prices, equity return and debt per capita.
g Estimating it = (1−ρ)(α+βpit,k+γxt,q)+ρit−1+ 1t. The instruments
are four lags of the interest rates, inflation, the output gap, world
commodity price inflation and the long-short spread.
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7 Conclusion
In this thesis we have, inspired by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000), es-
timated different types of forward looking Taylor rules. We have checked for
robustness by adding regressors, changing horizons, changing variable mea-
sures and changing sample periods. Although the evidence is not clear, we
found for most specifications that for the sample period 1999Q1 - 2012Q4,
Norges Bank reacted to both inflation changes and output gap changes. The
inflation coefficient was above unity in most of the specifications, suggest-
ing that Norges Bank has followed the Taylor principle. In addition there
is evidence that Norges Bank put more weight on keeping the inflation rate
close to the target than keeping the output gap close to zero. For the full
sample period, we found that both foreign interest rates and the exchange
rate appear to be significant as regressors in a Taylor type rule, although the
sign for the exchange rate coefficient was unexpected. In addition, the vari-
able created to measure the housing price deviation from trend was largely
significant in the full sample period. However the inclusion of this variable
as a separate regressor in the estimated reaction function rendered both the
inflation and the output gap coefficients insignificant.
We also found that the flexible horizon for the inflation target of 1-3 years
makes it hard to draw conclusions from the estimation results. The results
from a 3-year horizon seemed highly implausible, and there are substantial
differences for the coefficients when we considered a 1 year horizon inflation
as opposed to a 2 year horizon. In particular, for the 2 year horizon the
inflation coefficient was lower and the output gap coefficient was higher than
in the 1 year horizon case, which is not surprising. The reason is that if
Norges Bank has a 2 year horizon for inflation, it does not have to conduct
monetary policy as aggressively as if it has a 1 year horizon. Hence, it can
put more weight on stabilizing output. We also found that changing the
horizon for the output gap from 1 to 2 quarters, changed the coefficients
when using the baseline instrument set, although not much when using the
full instrument set.
To check for robustness we also implemented alternative variable mea-
sures to check whether the results from our baseline model were robust. We
found that for most cases, although the qualitative results rarely changed
much, the size of the coefficients differed largely when using alternative mea-
sures for inflation and the output gap. In particular, when using a different
parameter for the HP-trend for the output gap, we found that output may
have been targeted as much as, or more than what inflation has. Additionally,
the results were not robust to the choice of the housing price variable.
We also looked for structural breaks by splitting the full sample period at
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the time of the financial crisis in the third quarter of 2008. There is evidence
that inflation deviations from target was closed much more aggressively in
the period before the financial crisis. The results from the post financial
crisis time period suggest that other variables than inflation and the output
gap were targeted, as the coefficient for both of these two baseline regressors
are close to zero and insignificant. However because we end the estimation
in 2011Q4 there are too few observations to make strong conclusions from
this time period. In addition, we looked for a structural break at the time
the inflation target horizon changed from 2 years to 1-3 years. No conclusive
results could be obtained from this exercise.
When comparing the empirical findings to previous Taylor rule estima-
tions for Norway, we cannot say whether or not our results are as expected.
The reason is that the estimation results are largely dependant on the sample
period, estimation method and model specification, and none of the previ-
ous literature are identical to the choices made in this thesis. Our results are
however in most cases corresponding with the strategy reported in the Norges
Bank monetary policy reports. However there are a number of reasons why
the results presented in this thesis should be read with some reservations.
First of all, it is possible that we do not have enough variation in some
of our variable series, hence the estimations can be misleading. As noted by
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000):
Suppose, for example, that the Federal Reserve responds aggres-
sively to large deviations of inflation from target but not to small
deviations. Then by estimating over a time period where infla-
tion does not vary much from its target, one might mistakenly
conclude that the Fed is not aggressive in fighting inflation (i.e.,
one might mistakenly obtain too low an estimate of β).
Another reason why we should be careful drawing conclusions is related to
how our model is estimated. The estimation method used is generalized
method of moments, which relies on the J-test of overidentifying restrictions
to indicate whether a specification of a model can be rejected. When per-
forming similar baseline estimations, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) find
that the overidentifying restrictions are not violated. When they add alter-
native regressors the coefficients hardly change. Hence they conclude that
the baseline model to a large degree can describe the decisions of the Federal
Reserve. In this thesis, we see that although the overidentifying restricions
are not violated for the baseline case, coefficients change substantially when
adding alternative regressors. This suggests that the power of the J-test is
limited in our context, as some of the estimated Taylor rules in this thesis
may be misspecified.
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Third, throughout this thesis we proceed as if all our variables are sta-
tionary. From the ADF-test we see signs of non-stationarity for the interest
rate variable, which could be a possible reason for why the results are not
very robust.
For future research we suggest looking for a structural break when the
governor of Norges Bank was replaced in January 2011, when sufficient data
has been made available. Another possible approach to achieve more robust
findings could be to do a cointegration analysis in order to address the prob-
lem of potential non-stationarity for the interest rate. Other possibilities
could be to test other variables as regressors in different combinations, and
perform some forecasting exercises for those specifications that seem stable
with regards to variable measures and sample periods.
In any case it is clear that none of the specifications considered in this
thesis fully explains the variation in the interest rate, although the estima-
tions in this thesis can give a good indication of the objectives and concerns
of the Norwegian central bank.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Data appendix
i - Quarterly average of the 3-month Norwegian inter bank offered rate, in
annual percentages. Source: OECD database.
pi - Core inflation in Norway. Expressed as a 4 quarter log difference from
price indexes CPIJAE and CPI, in percentages. Source: Statbank, Statistics
Norway.
x - Output gap in Norway. Measured as a percentage deviation from a
trend. The trend is a HP-trend with a smoothing parameter of 40 000 (1600
for alternative variable) created in Eviews. Source: Statbank, Statistic Nor-
way.
s - Long-short spread in Norway. The difference between 10 year Norwe-
gian bonds and the NIBOR. Source: OECD database.
o - World commodity price inflation. Expressed as a 4 quarter log differ-
ence from a price index in percentages. Source: IMF’s International financial
Statistics database.
hou - Housing price gap in Norway. Measured as a percentage deviation
from a trend. The trend is a HP-trend with a smoothing parameter of 40
000 created in Eviews. Source: Statbank, Statistics Norway.
if - Foreign interest rates. The 4 quarter log difference of the euro-are 3
month interbank rate. Source: OECD database.
ex - Norwegian exchange rate. The 4 quarter log difference of the I-44 (the
import weighted currency index). Source: Norges Bank
eq - Equity return. The 4 quarter log difference of the OSEBX. Source:
OECD database.
d - Debt per capita gap in Norway. The 4 quarter log difference of debt
per capita. Source: Statbank, Statistics Norway.
u - Unemployment rate from the Labor Force Survey. Source: Statbank,
Statistics Norway
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wag - Nominal wages. Expressed as a 4 quarter log difference to be in-
cluded in the alternative housing price variable. Source: Statbank, Statistics
Norway.
8.2 Testing for non-stationarity - The ADF test
To test for non-stationarity we have employed the augmented Dickey Fuller
test. We have:
∆Yt = α + βt+ γYt−1 +
P∑
p=1
δp∆Yt−p + t (35)
where α is a constant and β is the time trend coefficient. Our null hypoth-
esis is that |γ| = 0, i.e., that the time series is not stationary. Our alternative
hypothesis is that |γ| 6= 0, namely that the time series Yt converges to a sta-
tionary time series. In the ADF-test we allow for lags to correct for potential
serial correlation, and because we look at inflation from a 4 quarter per-
spective we use 4 order of lags. The results from the ADF-test are given in
16
It is natural to use 4 order of lags because we initially look at inflation
from a 4 quarter perspective. Our results are given in Table 16.
We see that for the 1-year inflation non-stationarity is rejected when 3
lags are included. We can not however reject non-stationarity at any lag
level for a two year horizon inflation within 4 lags. For the 3-year inflation,
non-stationarity is rejected when 4 lags are included. For the various output
gap measures we can reject non-stationarity for most lag specifications. This
is not true for the unemployment rate variable, where we fail to reject non-
stationarity for all lag specifications. For the interest rate, we cannot reject
non stationarity at any lag level, hence according to the ADF-test we have
that the output gap measures, the 1-year inflation and the 3-year inflation
is I(0), while for the other variables we cannot reject that they are I(1). All
our other variables are differences or HP-filtered gaps, and are all stationary
by the view of the ADF-test, hence they are not included in the table.
8.3 The J-test
Here we show how the J-statistic is calculated, and the explanation follows
Su (2012). We want the optimal weighting matrix M that minimizes the
asymptotic covariance matrix:
V = (D
′
MD)−1D
′
MSMD(D
′
MD)−1 (36)
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Table 16: ADF-test for main variables
Lags 0 1 2 3 4 Constant Trend
Variable:
Inflation, 1
year
−1.64 −1.99 −2.78 −2.92∗ −1.86 Yes No
Inflation, 2
year
−1.23 −1.69 −2.83 −2.78 −2.85 Yes No
Inflation, 3
year
−0.63 −1.21 −1.86 −2.06 −3.17∗ Yes No
Inflation, CPI −3.40∗ −3.33∗ −3.51∗ −4.18∗∗ −2.31 Yes No
Output gap, 1
quarter
−0.95 −3.88∗∗ −2.45∗ −2.71∗∗ −2.16∗ No No
Output gap, 2
quarters
−1.72 −2.79∗∗ −2.46∗ −2.99∗∗ −1.94 No No
Output gap,
HP-1600
−1.07 −3.94∗∗ −2.48∗ −2.72∗∗ −2.14∗ No No
Unemployment
rate
−0.22 −0.16 −0.11 −0.07 −0.16 Yes No
The interest
rate
−1.27 −2.08 −1.89 −1.50 −1.78 Yes No
a ADF-test for main variables. Level of significance ∗ = 5% and ∗∗ = 1%.
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As it turns out, the answer is M = S−1. The asymptotic covariance matrix
then reduces from
V = (D
′
S−1D)−1D
′
S−1SS−1D(D
′
S−1D)−1 (37)
to
V = (D
′
S−1D)−1
D
′
S−1D
D′S−1D
(38)
which leaves us with
V = (D
′
S−1D)−1 (39)
We construct the test statistic by letting θ̂ be the GMM estimator. From
our null hypothesis we expect that gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) is close to zero. Now
we define the J-statistic as
J = nHn(gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt)) (40)
where
Hn = gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt)
′
MgT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) (41)
and n is the number of observations in the estimation. We know that M =
S−1 hence the J-test statistic will be
J = ngT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt)
′
S−1gT (θ,yt,Wt,Xt) (42)
The J-statistic has a chi square distribution
Jn
d→ χ2m−k (43)
where m is the number of instruments and k is the number of parameters
estimated. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis if the J-statistic is higher
than χ2m−k for our chosen level of significance.
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8.4 Correlation matrix
Table 17: Correlation matrixa
i pi(4) x(1) if ex hou o s eq d
i 1 0.61 0.34 0.21 -0.21 0.33 -0.11 -0.88 -0.45 0.19
pi(4) 0.61 1 0.73 0.30 0.13 0.64 -0.04 -0.61 -0.13 0.11
x(1) 0.34 0.73 1 0.39 0.06 0.63 0.13 -0.37 0.18 0.47
if 0.21 0.30 0.39 1 -0.02 0.47 0.51 -0.31 0.30 0.46
ex -0.21 0.13 0.06 -0.02 1 -0.17 -0.41 0.21 -0.07 -0.11
hou 0.33 0.64 0.63 0.47 -0.17 1 0.23 -0.32 0.20 0.28
o -0.11 -0.04 0.13 0.51 -0.41 0.23 1 0.07 0.67 0.25
s -0.88 -0.61 -0.37 -0.31 0.21 -0.32 0.07 1 0.54 0.01
eq -0.45 -0.13 0.18 0.30 -0.07 0.20 0.67 0.54 1 0.40
d 0.19 0.11 0.47 0.46 -0.11 0.28 0.25 0.01 0.40 1
a See data appendix for more information about the variables
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